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SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW, SOMETHING BOR-
ROWED, SOMETHING LONG OVERDUE: THE EVOLUTION OF A 
"SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BLIND" LEGAL SYSTEM IN MARYLAND 
AND THE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Jefferson once opined that the United States Constitution 
should be revised by each "new majority" and "handed on, with peri-
odic repairs, from generation to generation to the end of time.'" Our 
constitutional jurisprudence embraces an altogether different ap-
proach to revolution than that advocated by Jefferson. The bedrock 
principle of a flexible, broadly-read Constitution which adapts to 
changing circumstances allows revolution to occur at the judge's 
bench rather than at the ballot box.2 Historically, this revolutionary 
impulse has resonated in generational expansions of substantive due 
process and equal protection rights under our "living" Constitution. 3 
1. JEAN M. YARBROUGH, AMERICAN VIRTUES: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON THE CHAR. 
ACTER OF A FREE PEOPLE 118 (Univ. Press of Kan. 1998) (quoting Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Earle (Sept. 24, 1823), in 15 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 470-71 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed. 1907)). Jeffer-
son advocated for frequent constitutional change because of his belief that 
"one generation is to another as one independent nation is to another" and 
that "the earth belongs to the living" and not bygone figures of past genera-
tions. DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAsJEFFER-
SON 302-03 (Univ. Press of Va. 1994) (quoting Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON 
AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 392-95 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1950)). 
2. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,407,415 (1819) ("[W]e must never 
forget, it is a constitution we are expounding .... intended to endure for 
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs."). The Supreme Court has rejected Jefferson's notion that a 
majority of citizens may determine the individual rights of all citizens under 
the Constitution. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624,638 (1943) ("One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a 
free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights 
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elec-
tions."). Rather, it is the judiciary that interprets the Constitution and the 
rights it bestows. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
3. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 577-78 (2003) (striking down 
a Texas sodomy statute as violative of privacy rights protected by due pro-
cess and overturning Bowers v. Hardwick's contrary ruling twenty years 
prior); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116, 163-65 (1973) (invalidating a cen-
tury-old Texas law criminalizing pre-viability abortions as violative of the 
Due Process Clause); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (find-
ing that segregation in public schools violated equal protection and dis-
carding the nearly sixty year-old 'separate but equal' doctrine). See infra 
text accompanying notes 165-68 for a discussion and explanation of Bowers. 
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In fact, the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this prin-
ciple in Lawrence v. Texas,4declaring that "[a]s the Constitution en-
dures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their 
own search for greater freedom."5 
The next generational revolution, and perhaps the final frontier, of 
civil rights jurisprudence is that of the protection and equality of 
homosexuals. Already, this generation has seen great strides forward 
in the legal rights of gays and lesbians, particularly with respect to 
marriage-like rights.6 Maryland, however, still denies same-sex 
couples the fundamental right to marry enjoyed by opposite-sex 
couples,7 and the number of couples affected by this is profound. 
The 2000 Census indicated that 12,632 same-sex couples resided in 
Maryland, accounting for twelve percent of unmarried partner house-
holds in the state.8 The lack of equality in marriage rights for homo-
sexuals is especially problematic for a state that ranks sixteenth among 
all states in the number of same-sex couple residents.9 For the more 
than 25,000 Maryland gays and lesbians in same-sex relationships, the 
recognition of same-sex marriage is the one remaining, and most im-
4. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
5. Id. at 579. 
6. Compare Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 
2003) (detennining that the exclusion of same-sex couples from entering 
in to marriage violates state equal protection and due process guaran tees), 
and Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the 
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution requires that same-
sex couples be granted the same benefits and protections of marriage 
granted to opposite-sex couples), with Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189-
91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (finding that the ban on same-sex marriage does 
not violate the state equal rights amendment), and Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (declaring that neither the federal equal 
protection nor the due process clause is offended by the state's prohibition 
on same-sex marriage). 
7. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2004) ("Only a marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid in this State."). 
8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 U.S. CENSUS SUMMARY FILE 3 (2000), http:// 
www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/sumfile3.html (select "Data" 
hyperlink; select "Detailed Tables" hyperlink; select "State" from dropdown 
menu; add "Maryland" to Geography Selection; and follow to table 
"PCTI "). Although the Census does not specifically track same-sex couples, 
the U.S. Census Bureau has acknowledged that it diverts same-sex spouse 
and like responses to the unmarried partner category. See U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAU, POPULATION DIVISION, Fertility & Family Statistics Branch, TECHNICAL 
NOTE ON SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER DATA FROM THE 1990 AND 2000 
CENSUSES (2001), http://www.census.gov /population/www/ cen2000/ 
samesex.html. 
9. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS SUMMARY FILE 3 (2000), http://www. 
census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/sumfile3.html (select "Data" hyper-
link; select "Detailed Tables" hyperlink; select "All States" from dropdown 
menu; and follow to table "PCTl"). Moreover, the 4,977 black same-sex 
couples in the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area is the second larg-
est of such a demographic nationwide. Kelly Brewington, Caught Between 
Gay, Black Worlds, BALT. SUN, Oct. 7, 2004, at 1A. 
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portant, unrealized aspect of Maryland's "revolution" in sexual orien-
tation equality. 
Over the past decade, crucial facets of Maryland law have evolved, 
equalizing the legal protections of homosexuals and heterosexuals.1o 
The resultant "orientation-blind" legal system, which has systemati-
cally abolished the disparate treatment of people based on their sex-
ual orientation, cannot countenance the differentiation between the 
rights of homosexuals and heterosexuals. Accordingly, under substan-
tive due process analysis, the fundamental right to marry in Maryland 
exercised by an opposite-sex couple is identical to the right of a same-
sex couple to marry. Maryland's marriage statute,l1 then, should be 
declared unconstitutional to the extent that it limits valid marriages 
only to opposite-sex couples. 
This Comment will first discuss, in Part II, the development of sex-
ual orientation equality in Maryland law with particular emphasis on 
several critical family law decisions, changes to the criminal law, the 
passage of landmark anti-discrimination measures, and the implica-
tions of a local ordinance that extended same-sex partnership benefits 
to county employees. Finally, in light of Maryland's sexual orienta-
tion-blind legal system, Part III will analyze and vindicate the right to 
same-sex marriage under the substantive due process standard ap-
plied to putative fundamental rights. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARYLAND'S "ORIENTATION-
BLIND" LEGAL SYSTEM 
Over the past decade, Maryland statutory, regulatory, and case law 
have developed a trend of eliminating discrimination against homo-
sexuals and equalizing the legal footing on which both homosexuals 
and heterosexuals stand.12 This movement towards increased equality 
of sexual orientations spans the gamut of legal contexts and has accel-
erated in both its scope and effect in the past four years. I3 Some of 
the most important developments have occurred in the jurisprudence 
of family law, criminal law, anti-discrimination legislation, as well as 
the extension of county same-sex partnership benefits. 
A. The Equalization of Homosexuals' Parental Rights in Maryland Family 
Law 
The equality of sexual orientations that has developed in the family 
law context is one of the most compelling examples of this emerging 
principle of equality in Maryland law and bears heavily on the argu-
ment for marriage equality. Over ten years ago, Maryland courts be-
10. See infra Part II. 
11. FAM. LAw § 2-201. 
12. See infra Part II.A-D. 
13. See infra Part II.A.2-3, B, C.l. 
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gan to specifically protect the parental rights of homosexuals by 
eliminating the distinction between sexual orientations in determin-
ing those rights. 14 The courts firmly rejected the notion that homo-
sexuals were unfit for the visitation, custody, and adoption of children 
because of their sexual orientation. 15 These developments are partic-
ularly compelling for the recognition of same-sex marriage given the 
deeply intimate and familial nature that is shared by parenthood and 
marriage. 
1. The Visitation Rights of Homosexuals 
In 1994, the full panel of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
grappled with the issue of homosexual parents' visitation rights in 
North v. North,16 the first reported case of its kind in Maryland. 17 The 
North court held that a lower trial court abused its discretion in deny-
ing a homosexual man overnight visitation of his children due to the 
"perceived harms" resulting from his sexual orientation. 18 Notably, all 
but one of the dissenting members of the court in North acknowledged 
that any special weight given to Mr. North's homosexuality by the trial 
court was improper. 19 The largest bloc of dissenters even agreed that 
homosexuality, by itself, could not be used as a factor in denying visita-
tion, nor could exposing children to such a sexual orientation be 
deemed inherently harmful. 20 Judge Cathell's dissent espoused an ap-
proach indicative of the sexual orientation equality principle argued 
in this Comment, stating, "I do not believe the issue should be treated 
differently because of the appellant's homosexuality .... "21 
Four years later, the Maryland Court of Appeals conclusively settled 
the issue of visitation rights of homosexual parents in Boswell v. Bos-
welL 22 The case involved a couple who separated after the husband 
revealed to his wife that he was a homosexual. 23 Invalidating a restric-
14. See North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1,648 A.2d 1025 (1994) (en bane). See 
also infra Part IIA.1 for a discussion of this case. 
15. See infra Part II.A.I-4. 
16. 102 Md. App. 1, 648 A.2d 1025. 
17. Hope D. Miller, The Maryland Suroey: 1998-1999: Recent Decisions: The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland: Family Law, 59 MD. L. REv. 1132, 1143 (2000). 
18. North, 102 Md. App. at 16, 648 A.2d at 1033 (holding the trial court's prohi-
bition on Mr. North's overnight visitation to be inconsistent with his un-
supervised day-time visitation). 
19. Id. at 29-30, 648 A.2d at 1039 (Murphy, j., dissenting) (failing to comment 
on the -relation between the visitation restriction and Mr. North's 
homosexuality) . 
20. Id. at 22, 648 A.2d at 1035 (Bishop, J., dissenting in which Fischer, j., con-
curs) ("We agree that there is no evidence in the record that Mr. North's 
homosexuality would likely cause harm to his children or that Mr. North's 
homosexuality, considered alone, should preclude overnight visitation 
.... "). 
21. Id. at 25, 648 A.2d at 1037 (Cathell, j., dissenting). 
22. 352 Md. 204, 721 A.2d 662 (1998). 
23. Id. at 210, 721 A.2d at 664. 
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tion placed on the father's visitation, the Court of Appeals rejected 
the lower court's rationale that the children's exposure to their fa-
ther's homosexual relationship was a dispositive factor. 24 Instead, the 
court favored a rule for evaluating the propriety of visitation orders 
that "applies to both heterosexual and homosexual relationships" 
equally.25 That rule requires that in all visitation cases, including ones 
involving non-marital partners, restrictions on visitation should be re-
viewed under the best interests of the child standard.26 The Boswell 
court declared that, in such cases, the best interests are achieved by 
inquiring whether an adverse impact is being made on the child, and 
if so, whether that harm can be attributed to the child's contact with 
the non-marital partner. 27 If no such connection can be found there 
can be no restrictions placed on the non-custodial parent's visitation 
rights.28 
In Boswell, the court also built on the holding of North and forbade 
the denial or limitation of a parent's visitation of his or her child 
based solely upon "one factor, such as a parent's ... homosexuality, to 
the exclusion of all others."29 In fact, the court stressed the inherent 
equality of the process by stating that" [w] e make no distinctions as to 
the sexual preference of the non-custodial parent whose visitation is 
being challenged."30 Thus, the Boswell court not only declined the 
invitation to follow the trial court's declaration that non-marital ho-
mosexual relationships are per se deleterious to children in visitation 
disputes,31 but also placed the non-marital relationships of homosexu-
als on the same plane as those of heterosexuals. 
The court's insistence that determinations of child visitation be 
made without respect to the non-custodial parent's homosexuality or 
involvement in a same-sex relationship32 created the foundation for 
the sexual orientation-blind legal system in Maryland. In these early 
cases, the court's equal treatment of homosexuals in the exercise of 
their visitation rights was rooted in the basic comparability between 
homosexual and heterosexual relationships.33 Equality for homosex-
24. Id. at 239-40, 721 A.2d at 679. 
25. Id. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678. 
26. Id. at 236-37, 721 A.2d at 678. 
27. Id. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 224, 721 A.2d at 671. 
30. Id. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678. 
31. Id. at 211,213-14,721 A.2d at 665-67 (quoting the trial court visitation or-
der that "prohibited any overnight visitation and visitation with the chil-
dren in the presence of [the father's gay partner] or 'anyone having 
homosexual tendencies or such persuasions, male or female, or with any-
one that the father may be living with in a non-marital relationship'''). 
32. See id. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678. 
33. Indeed, psychologists have found that there is little difference between the 
two types of relationships. See generally LETITIA ANNE PEPLAU & SUSAN D. 
COCHRAN, A Relational Perspective on Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXUALI"IY/ HET. 
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ual parents in North and Boswell though, was still based upon a compar-
ison to a precedent or concurrent heterosexual relationship on the 
part of the gay parent.34 That paradigm changed in 2000 when the 
Court of Special Appeals examined the viability of same-sex parenting 
and the visitation rights of homosexual partners solely within the con-
text of a same-sex relationship alone. 
2. Homosexual "De Facto" Parenthood and Visitation 
In the groundbreaking case of S.F. v. M.D.,35 decided two years after 
Boswell, the Court of Special Appeals encountered the issue of "de 
facto parent" visitation after the dissolution of a "committed domestic 
relationship" between two women.36 As an initial step, the court rec-
ognized the existence of "de facto parents" within same-sex relation-
ships in Maryland.37 The court then held that such parents not only 
have standing to seek visitation, but also that the parent requesting 
visitation would not have to demonstrate unfitness of the biological 
parent or "exceptional circumstances" to be awarded visitation.38 
Importantly, in its visitation analysis, the court in S.F. equated the 
same-sex relationship of the two women with that of a married 
couple.39 This comparison is more than a convenient analogy for the 
court. Rather, it is one of several indicative examples of the growing 
consensus among courts in Maryland that families of same-sex part-
ners function in much the same way as do families of opposite-sex 
partners.40 Thus, homosexual couples raising families deserve the le-
EROSEXUALrIY. CONCEPTS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 321, 333-34 (David P. Mc-
Whirter, et aI., eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1990). 
34. See Boswell, 352 Md. at 210, 721 A.2d at 664 (relating the facts of Mr. and 
Mrs. Boswell's eight-year marriage); North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 3-4, 
648 A.2d 1025, 1027 (1994) (en banc) (recounting Mr. North's problem-
atic ten-year marriage to his wife). 
35. 132 Md. App. 99, 751 A.2d 9 (2000). 
36. Id. at 102, 751 A.2d at 10-11. The phrase "committed domestic relation-
ship," is the court's own term for describing the seven-year relationship be-
tween two women who cooperatively raised a child born as a result of 
artificial insemination of one of the women. Id. at 102-03, 751 A.2d at lO-
ll. 
37. Id. at 111, 751 A.2d at 15. The court defined "de facto parent" vis-a.-vis its 
recital of the elements a third party must satisfy to be considered such a 
parent: "the legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship be-
tween the third party and the child; the third party must have lived with the 
child; the third party must perform parental functions for the child to a 
significant degree; and most important, a parent-child bond must be 
forged." Id. (quoting V.G. v. MJ.B., 748 A.2d 539,551 (NJ. 2000»; see also 
In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (listing the 
four elements of de facto parenthood). 
38. S.F., 132 Md. App. at 110-12, 751 A.2d at 15. 
39. Id. at 112, 751 A.2d at 15 ("The case before us is most akin to a stepparent 
seeking visitation. "). 
40. See supra and infra Part II.A.I-4. 
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gal equality granted to heterosexuals commensurate with their func-
tional and conceptual equivalency. 
3. Custody Rights of Homosexuals 
Child custody is another important family law issue for homosexual 
couples as part of this trend of sexual orientation equality. In 2000, 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland weighed in on the issue of 
granting child custody to homosexuals in Gestl v. FrederickY The case 
involved a custody dispute filed under the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Act (UCCJA) by Gestl, a Maryland woman, against her same-
sex partner, Frederick.42 The UCCJA was invoked when Frederick 
moved back to Tennessee five years after giving birth to the child the 
couple was raising together in Maryland.43 Mter the court deter-
mined that Maryland courts possessed jurisdiction under the 
UCCJA,44 and that Tennessee did not present an available alternative 
forum for the dispute to be heard,45 the court held that Gestl had 
standing to claim custody of Frederick's biological child.46 
The Gestl court observed that Maryland law "recognizes a third 
party's right to custody over a natural parent if exceptional circum-
stances exist which make it in the best interests of the child to award 
custody to the third party."47 Further, the court stated that its reading 
of the already seminal biological parent rights case of Troxel v. Gran-
ville48 was not inconsistent with this permissive formulation of custody 
rights for non-biological parents.49 In fact, due to Troxefs strong pre-
41. 133 Md. App. 216, 754 A.2d 1087 (2000). 
42. Id. at 221-22, 754 A.2d at 1090. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 225-26, 754 A.2d at 1092-93. 
45. Id. at 243, 754 A.2d at 1101. The court determined that Tennessee was not 
an available alternative forum in this case specifically because its substantive 
law would deny "a non-biological parent claiming to be a de facto parent" 
the standing extended to such parents in Maryland. Id. 
46. Id. at 244, 754 A.2d at 1102. 
47. Id. at 241, 754 A.2d at 1100. 
48. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). In Troxel, the Supreme Court invalidated a Washington 
non-parental visitation statute on substantive due process grounds because 
the statute "impermissibly interfere[d] with the fundamental right of par-
ents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their 
children." Gestl, 133 Md. App. at 242,754 A.2d at 1101 (quoting Troxel,530 
U.S. at 60, 66). The Court of Special Appeals in Gestl found it dispositive 
that 
[t]he Court expressly declined ... to reach the question of 
whether parental unfitness was always a prerequisite in order to jus-
tify intervention in decisions concerning custody and visitation. It 
also suggested that intervention in custody and visitation decisions 
might be justified, when the intervention was 'founded ... on spe-
cial factors,' rather than merely a generalized best interest analysis. 
Id. at 242-43, 754 A.2d at 1001 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68). 
49. Gestl, 133 Md. App. at 243, 754 A.2d at 1101. 
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sumption in favor of biological parents,50 which is echoed in Maryland 
law,51 and the inherent reality of same-sex relationships that only one 
partner will be a biological parent, the custody rights of non-biological 
same-sex parents announced in Gestl is likely the most permissive of all 
the constitutionally-viable constructions possible. 
The Gestl court ultimately found that Donna Gestl was a "person 
acting as parent"52 and specifically allowed the opportunity for some-
thing that, at best, Boswell only implied53 - that with the proper allega-
tions, homosexuals could now be granted child custody without their 
sexual orientation being used against them.54 Importantly, this case 
established custody rights for the partners of same-sex relationships 
that mirror those exercised by opposite-sex couples as closely as the 
circumstances would allow. 55 As a result, Maryland courts made avail-
able yet another institution of family law for homosexual relationships 
that had previously only been available for heterosexuals. The Gestl 
decision is yet another crucial step in the process of equalizing the 
rights and protections bestowed upon same-sex and opposite-sex rela-
tionships in Maryland. 
4. Adoption by Homosexuals and Same-Sex Couples 
At the outset, it should be noted that Maryland law does not ex-
pressly permit or deny the adoption of children by same-sex couples. 56 
50. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66,68 ("[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in 
the best interests of their children."). 
51. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178,372 A.2d 582,587 (1977) ("When the 
dispute is between a biological parent and a third party, it is presumed that 
the child's best interest is subserved by custody in the parent.") (emphasis 
added). 
52. Gesti, 133 Md. App. at 244, 754 A.2d at 1102. 
53. Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 222, 721 A.2d 662, 670-71 (1998) ("These 
best interest factors also apply to visitation, as well as any other proceeding 
where the best interest of the child is at issue.") (emphasis added). Earlier, the 
court stated that a child's best interests are implicated in "visitation, cus-
tody, and adoption" proceedings. Id. at 219,721 A.2d at 669. The lack of 
an announcement of a different test for custody or adoption by homosexu-
als implies that those actions would not be denied because of their sexual 
orientation. 
54. Gesti, 133 Md. App. at 243-44, 754 A.2d at 110l. 
55. Since biological reality prevents a same-sex couple from producing mutu-
ally genetic children, the custody regime for gay couples established in Gesti 
by extending a cause of action to a "non-biological parent who has had 
joint custody of a child with the biological parent" is the closest equivalent 
to the regime utilized by opposite-sex couples, who are capable of being 
mutually biological parents. Id. 
56. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-309(a) (LexisNexis 2004) ("Any adult may 
petition a court to decree an adoption.") (repealed by the Permanency for 
Families and Children Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 2581 (to be reenacted as 
FAM. LAw §§ 5-331 (b) (1) (adoption without prior termination of parental 
rights), 5-345 (b) (1) (adoption after termination of parental rights), 5-3A-
29(a) (private adoption), 5-3B-13(b) (1) (independent adoption))). 
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Rather, the statute uses broad and inclusive language,57 in contrast to 
Florida's statute completely prohibiting such adoptions. 58 Though re-
ported cases of same-sex couple adoptions are rare,59 evidence sug-
gests that adoptions by same-sex couples are quite commonplace in 
Maryland courts.60 The most common form of adoption under this 
broad, permissive scheme is the "second parent" adoption, which in-
volves the adoption of one partner's natural child by the natural par-
ent's same-sex partner without sacrificing the natural parent's 
parental rights.61 This form of adoption may occur as a result of a 
number of varying circumstances, including the non-adoptive natural 
parent's willful termination of their parental rights,62 or an imposed 
termination of rights due to abuse, failing to maintain meaningful 
contact with the child, or some other harm imposed on the child by 
that parent. 63 While other adoptions result in the automatic termina-
57. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Moreover, the statute further pro-
vides that a court may not deny a petition for adoption because the peti-
tioner is single or does not have a spouse, thus pre-empting courts from 
denying same-sex couples, who cannot currently marry under Maryland 
law, the ability to adopt. FAM. LAw § 5-309(b) (repealed by the Permanency 
for Families and Children Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 2581 (to be reen-
acted as FAM. LAw § 5-349(b) ("In ruling on a petition for adoption ... a 
juvenile court may not deny a petition for adoption solely because the peti-
tioner is single or unmarried."»). 
58. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005) ("No person eli&ible to adopt 
under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual. '); see also Lof-
ton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 
2004) (affirming the constitutionality of the Florida statute), cm. denied, 
125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). Until an amendment passed in 1999, New Hamp-
shire also forbade same-sex adoptions. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 
(Supp. 1989) ("[AJny individual not a minor and not a homosexual may 
adopt."). 
59. See, e.g., In re Petition of D.L.G. & MAH., No. 95-179001/CAD, 2 MFLM 
Supp. 21 (Cir. Ct. BaIt. City June 27, 1996). The D.L.G. decision was the 
first reported case of a same-sex second parent adoption in Maryland. Judge 
Approves Same-Sex Adoption Petition; Second Ever in Maryland, MD. FAM. L. 
MONTHLY (The Daily Record, Baltimore, Md.), February 1997, at 16. 
60. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 32, Deane v. Conaway (Civ. No. 24-C-04-005390) (Cir. 
Ct. Balt. City June 14,2005) (on file with author); see also Ryiah Lilith, The 
G.I.F. T. of Two Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 AM. U J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & 
L. 207, 214 n.49 (2001); 25 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 1, 14 (Thomson West ed., 
2004). 
6l. See Lilith, supra note 60, at 214 nn.47-48; see also 25 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 1, 
supra note 60, at 9. 
62. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-311 (b) (LexisNexis 2004) (repealed by the 
Permanency for Families and Children Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 2581) 
(to be reenacted as FAM. LAw § 5-350(a) (when the non-adoptive parent's 
rights have been terminated, adoption is allowed when the individual's 
guardian only consents». 
63. FAM. LAw § 5-313 (repealed by the Permanency for Families and Children 
Act of 2005,2005 Md. Laws 2581 Ch 464) (to be reenacted as FAM. LAw § 5-
3B-21 ("In ruling under this subsection, a court shall give primary consider-
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tion of a natural parent's parental rights,64 a statutory exception for 
second parent adoptions preserves the adoptive natural parent's 
rights.65 
Maryland's first reported case of a same-sex second parent adop-
tion, In re Petition of D.L. c. & M.A.H., 66 made two crucial findings with 
respect to same-sex parent adoptions. First, Judge Friedman of the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City found that Maryland's adoption stat-
ute "does not prohibit adoption by same-sex partners,"67 a finding 
supported in large measure by the analysis in North v. North. 68 Second, 
the court extended the second parent adoption exception to the les-
bian partners in D.L. C. in reliance upon similar extensions in other 
states.69 Ultimately, the court granted the adoption based on its find-
ing that doing so was unquestionably in the best interests of the 
couples' children.70 
Interestingly, Maryland law provides that once adopted, children in 
same-sex partnership families are "entitled to all the rights and privi-
leges of and [are] subject to all the obligations of children born to the 
adoptive parents."71 Not only does this provision ensure the equal 
rights and protection of adoptive children, but its language also sig-
nals something important about the expansiveness of the concept of 
ation to the health and safety of the prospective adoptee in detennining 
the prospective adoptee's best interests.")). 
64. FAM. LAw § 5-308 (b) (2) (repealed by the Permanency for Families and 
Children Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 2581) (to be reenacted as FAM. LAw 
§§ 5-341 (a)(2)(ii) (adoption without prior tennination of parental rights), 
5-352 (a) (2) (ii) (adoption with prior tennination of parental rights), 5-3A-
35(a)(2) (ii) (private adoption), 5-3B-24(a) (2) (ii) (independent 
adoption) ). 
65. FAM. LAw § 5-315 (repealed by the Permanency for Families and Children 
Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 2581) (to be reenacted as FAM. LAw §§ 5-
331 (b) (2) (adoption without prior termination of parental rights), 5-
345(b)(2) (adoption with prior termination of parental rights), 5-3A-
29(c)(l) (private adoption), 5-3B-13(b)(2) (independent adoption)). 
66. No. 95-179001/CAD, 2 MFLM Supp. 21 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City June 27, 1996). 
67. Id. at 22. The court also noted several studies supporting its finding that 
"[t]here appears to be no substantiation for the view that homosexuals can-
not properly raise children .... " Id. at 24. 
68. Id. at 22. See supra Part II.A.l for a discussion of North. 
69. Id. at 23-24 (recognizing that New Jersey, New York, and Colorado have 
extended the second parent adoption exception to same-sex couples). 
70. Id. at 24 ("The children are both happy and healthy; each consented with-
out reservation to these adoptions . . . there have been no discern able ill 
effects brought upon these children by the de facto family the petitioners 
have created. The benefits of granting this adoption, on the other hand, 
are overwhelming."). 
71. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-308 (b) (1) (ii) (LexisNexis 2004) (repealed by 
the Permanency for Families and Children Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 
2581) (to be reenacted as FAM. LAw §§ 5-341 (a)(2) (i) (adoption without 
prior termination of parental rights), 5-352 (a) (2) (i) (adoption with prior 
tennination of parental rights), 5-3A-35(a)(2)(i) (private adoption), 5-3B-
24(b)(l) (independent adoption)). 
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family in Maryland law. By operation of this statute and the "wedlock" 
language therein, the adoptive children of same-sex couples are 
viewed in the same way as those of opposite-sex couples in the marital 
sense. 
Furthermore, the simple fact that same-sex couples are permitted to 
adopt is another foundational aspect of the principle of sexual orien-
tation equality that has developed in Maryland law. In courts around 
the state, judges have decided time and again that two loving, caring, 
and responsible same-sex partners are well-suited to raise a child.72 
The gravity and importance of granting an adoption petition submit-
ted by a homosexual couple differs very little from the issuance of a 
marriage license. Both actions cut to the heart of intimate familial 
relations and serve as the foundations of our society as social human 
beings: parenting and marriage. Quite often, in the view of Maryland 
and federal courts, these concepts are inextricably intertwined.73 
How these fundamental rights could be divorced from each other 
when they are sought to be exercised by homosexuals defies both 
logic and fundamental fairness. 74 
B. The Incorporation of Sexual Orientation Equality into Maryland Crimi-
nalLaw 
Much like the advancements in the family law context that provide 
the foundation for the orientation-blind principle, the criminal laws 
of Maryland have also evolved in a manner consonant with sexual ori-
entation equality. Two developments in particular have reshaped Ma-
ryland criminal law: one, essentially de-criminalizing homosexual 
sodomy and, the other, implying that the "battered spouse" defense is 
available to an abused member of a same-sex relationship. 
1. The Decriminalization of Homosexual Sodomy 
The sweeping language in the landmark Supreme Court case of 
Lawrence v. Texas,75 which invalidated a sodomy statute that targeted 
72. See supra notes 59-60. 
73. See, e.g., In reYve S., 373 Md. 551, 565-66, 819 A.2d 1030, 1038-39 (2003) 
(quoting Wolinksi v. Browneller, 115 Md. App. 285, 297-98, 693 A.2d 30, 35-
36 (1997) ("Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska . .. and Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters ... , the Supreme Court, in a variety of contexts, has recognized that 
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage, family life, and the up-
bringing of children is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.") (citations omitted)). The Wolinski opinion quoted by YveS. 
also noted that the Maryland Declaration of Rights contemplates those 
same rights conceived under the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolinksi, 115 
Md. App. at 298 n.6, 693 A.2d at 35. 
74. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text. 
75. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). \ 
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consensual homosexual activity and overturned Bowers v. Hardwick,16 
has only solidified that which had already been achieved in Maryland 
four years earlier. In January 1999, a consent decree signed by the 
Maryland Attorney General's Office77 rendered the state's sodomy 
statute78 dead letter law just one year after the law's constitutionality 
had been challenged.79 In that challenge, a Maryland circuit court 
extended the ruling in the case of Schochet v. State,80 which excluded 
private heterosexual activity from the scope of the sodomy statute, to 
also exclude private homosexual activity.81 This extended ruling thus 
avoided the equal protection violation created by Schochet's unequal 
application of the law.82 
The advent of Lawrence and its implied overturning of Schochet,83 
Maryland's closest analog to Bowers v. Hardwick,84 simply punctuates 
Maryland's policy of abolishing discriminatory laws affecting homo-
sexuals. In that regard, the fact that Maryland's consent decree elimi-
nating its sodomy law predates Lawrence by four years is a measure of 
the state's dedication to sexual orientation equality. To be sure, the 
decriminalization of the uniquely private and consensual sexual activ-
ity of same-sex relationships is a cornerstone in the argument of equal-
ity between the different sexual orientations. Once again, Maryland 
law embodies the principle of equality by placing same-sex and oppo-
site-sex relationships on the same legal footing. 
2. The "Battered Spouse Syndrome" Defense in Same-Sex 
Relationshi ps 
An intriguing case decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
March, 2004 that considered the scope of the "Battered Spouse Syn-
drome" offers yet more evidence that same-sex relationships are re-
garded as equally worthy of the protections of the law. In State v. 
76. 478 U.S. 186, 191, 196 (1986) (holding that there is no fundamental right 
to engage in homosexual sodomy and affirming the constitutionality of 
state laws making such conduct illegal). 
77. See Scott Calvert, Ruling on Gays Stirs Up Emotions, BALT. SUN,june 28, 2003, 
at lA. 
78. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 3-321 (LexisNexis 2002). 
79. See Williams v. Glendening, No. 98036031/CL-I059, 1998 WL 965992 (Md. 
Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998). 
80. 320 Md. 714, 717, 580 A.2d 176, 177 (1990). 
8l. Williams, 1998 WL 965992, at *7. 
82. [d. ("It cannot be doubted ... that there would be an equal protection 
violation if acts, considered not criminal when committed by a heterosexual 
couple, could be prosecuted when practiced by a homosexual couple. 
There is simply no basis for the distinction."). 
83. 320 Md. at 717, 580 A.2d at 177 (holding that the statute forbidding "un-
natural or perverted sexual practices" does not encompass "consensual, 
noncommercial, heterosexual activity between adults in the privacy of the 
home," while leaving homosexual acts open to criminal prosecution). 
84. See supra note 76. 
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Smullen,8e. the court, in bringing the assertions of battered children 
within the ambit of the statutory Battered Spouse Syndrome86 self-de-
fense theory,87 pondered the scope of the defense with respect to 
same-sex relationships.88 Recognizing that defense theories like these 
are subject to expansion89 the Smullen court's dicta implied that the 
defense would be extended to same-sex relationships as an eligible 
type of "adult domestic relationship. "90 The court emphasized that 
"[a]lthough the bill [codifying the defense] used the terminology 
'battered spouse syndrome,' it made clear that it was applicable as well 
to former spouses, cohabitants, and former cohabitants .... "91 
The dicta of Smullen, then, implies that the defense is applicable to 
homosexuals for the same reasons that it applies to their heterosexual 
counterparts. First, such broad and sweeping terminology contem-
plates the inclusion of same-sex couples just as surely as it does other 
cohabitating couples of other sexual orientations. Moreover, homo-
sexuals are abused by their same-sex partners and with the same fre-
quency as members of opposite-sex relationships.92 Thus, the 
battered spouse syndrome is equally applicable to same-sex couples in 
the same way that the Smullen Court found that it applies to battered 
children: "[t]he underpinnings of that application, we believe, have 
been generally accepted in the psychological and legal communities 
and are therefore reliable."93 Those underpinnings are satisfied be-
ing that the incidence of abuse in relationships of both orientations 
and the underlying causes of that abuse are, sadly, universally true.94 
C. The Proliferation of Anti-Discrimination Measures Targeting Sexual Ori-
entation-Based Prejudice 
Another context in which homosexuals have achieved an important 
measure of equality with heterosexuals in Maryland is in the context 
of protection from discrimination. Positive developments in this 
85. 380 Md. 233,844 A.2d 429 (2004). 
86. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (LexisNexis 2002). 
87. 380 Md. at 268, 844 A.2d at 449 ("[W]e do hold that the battered spouse 
syndrome, as recognized in § 10-916, applies as well to battered children."). 
88. Id. at 258, 844 A.2d at 443 ("[Q]uestions arose whether the [battered 
spouse] syndrome was limited to wives trapped in a marital relationship 
with their abuser or included ... same-sex persons involved in a homosex-
ual communal relationship .... "). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 260, 844 A.2d at 444. 
91. Id. at 259, 844 A.2d at 444 (emphasis in original). 
92. Nancy E. Murphy, Queer justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic 
Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 335, 340 & n.34 (1995) (citing CLAIRE M. 
RENZETTI, VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN RELATIONSHIPS 18 
(Sage Publications 1992) (reporting that abuse occurs in about 25 to 30 
percent of both same-sex and opposite-sex relationships». 
93. Smullen, 380 Md. at 268, 844 A.2d at 449-50. 
94. Murphy, supra note 92, at 340 & n.36. 
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realm of the law are indicative of a design to equalize the once-unpro-
tected group with the rest of society in the eyes of the law. Indeed, the 
fundamental purpose of any anti-discrimination measure is to elimi-
nate disparate treatment between distinct segments of the population 
and the prejudices animating such treatment, thereby creating equal-
ity amongst all members of society.95 The magnitude of the measures 
currently in force in Maryland is, indeed, astounding. Certainly, the 
proceeding anti-discrimination laws and regulations buttress the legal 
equality of homosexuals in Maryland. 
l. The Antidiscrimination Act of 2001 
One ground-breaking law passed just four years ago, the Antidis-
crimination Act of 2001,96 added Maryland to the list of just eleven 
states and the District of Columbia that have placed a statewide ban 
on discrimination based on sexual orientation.97 The law prohibits 
discrimination in employment,98 housing,99 and public accommoda-
tions lOO based on one's particular real or perceived sexual orientation, 
whatever it may be.101 
Although the Act contains a proviso that disclaims any interpreta-
tion of the law as "authoriz[ing] or validat[ing]" same-sex marriage, 102 
it is still a critical step forward in the evolution of orientation-blind law 
in Maryland. Indeed, the Act's stated purpose and effect is to repudi-
ate disparate treatment based on sexual orientation.103 Interestingly, 
the Act makes no distinction as to homosexuality or heterosexuality in 
its effect, providing equal protection to all sexual orientations,104 thus 
providing protection on an orientation-blind basis. As a result, Mary-
land law once again embodies the principle of orientation equality by 












See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 13 (2000). 
2001 Md. Laws 2112. 
Catherine M. Brennan, Banning Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 
35 MD. B. J., May:June 2002 at 50, 51 (2002). 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(a)(I) (2003). 
Id. § 22(a) (1). 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5(b) (Supp. 2004). 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5(a) (Supp. 2004); id. §§ 15(j), 20(u) (2003) 
('" [S]exual orientation' means the identification of an individual as to male 
or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality."). 
2001 Md. Laws 2122. 
[d. at 2112 ("F[or] the purpose of prohibiting discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation .... "). 
See supra notes 98-101. 
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2. Other Statutory and Regulatory Measures Prohibiting Sexual Ori-
entation Discrimination 
Maryland law also prohibits sexual orientation discrimination by 
those employed in various professional vocations, including that of so-
cial workers 105 and judges. 106 What is more, as early as 1973, it was 
held that the mere homosexuality of an educational professional was 
not sufficient to either fail to hire,107 transfer or terminateI08 that per-
son. There is also a statute tailored to outlaw discrimination in collec-
tive bargaining labor relations for the Maryland-National Capital Park 
and Planning Commission,109 as well as two statutes prohibiting dis-
crimination in the operations of the Washington Suburban Sanitary 
Commission. 11 0 
There are also a great deal of regulations in force in Maryland that 
further the goal of equality between the sexual orientations in the 
state. The m.yority of these regulations propagate the state's anti-dis-









MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH ace. § 19-311 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). 
MD. R. 16-813 Canon 3 (LexisNexis Supp. 200S) ("A judge shall perform 
the duties of judicial office ... impartially, and without having or manifest-
ing bias or prejudice, including bias or prejudice based on . . . sexual 
orientation .... "). 
Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 3S9 F. Supp. 843, 8S3 (D. Md. 1973) ("[T]he 
Board of Education's policy of not knowingly employing any homosexuals 
is objectionable."), affd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974). 
Id. at 8S6 ("[M]ere knowledge that a teacher is homosexual is not sufficient 
to justify transfer or dismissal."). 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 28, § 2-112.1(f) (l)-(2) (2003). 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, § 1-107 (2003) (prohibiting discrimination by the 
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC»; id. § 3-102(h) (re-
quiring that contracts awarded by the WSSC must include terms requiring 
the contractor "[n]ot to discriminate in any manner against an employee 
or applicant for employment on the basis of ... sexual orientation"). 
MD. CODE REGS. 01.01.199S.19(I) (A) (11) (2004) (executive order to estab-
lish an equal employment opportunity program for state government to 
ensure personnel actions taken "without regard to ... [s]exual orienta-
tion"); id. 01.04.04.04(B) (7) (2004) (requiring the board of directors of 
Residential Child Care Programs to ensure that such programs do not dis-
criminate on the basis of sexual orientation); id. OS.04.11.18(A) (200S) 
(prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by sponsors or contractors 
in the Special Housing Opportunities Program); id. OS.OS.02.14(A) (200S) 
(prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the Multi-Family Housing 
Revenue Bond Financing Program); id. OS.17.01.1O(A) (200S) (prohibiting 
sexual orientation discrimination by sponsors in the Community Legacy 
Program); id. 07.03.03.07 (I) (9) (b) (2004) (deeming quitting a job because 
of sexual orientation discrimination as good cause for purposes of the Fam-
ily Investment Program); id. 07.03.08.02(B) (1) (h) (2004) (same in Emer-
gency Assistance to Families with Children program); id. 07.03.16.08(D) (2) 
(2004) (same in Refugee Cash Assistance program); id. 07.0S.03.09(A) (2) 
(2004) (prohibiting private child placement agencies from denying an ap-
plication because of the applicant's or the adoptive child's sexual orienta-
tion); id. 07.0S.03.1S(C) (2) (2004) (prohibiting the delay or denial of the 
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4. Anti-Discrimination Measures in Individual Maryland Counties 
In addition to the state-wide protections created by the Antidis-
crimination Act and other measures, some individual Maryland coun-
ties have passed ordinances prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination in a plentitude of its other manifestations. At present, 
five of Maryland's twenty-three counties and Baltimore City have their 
placement of an adoptive child because of the adoptive parent or child's 
sexual orientation); id. 1O.1B.06.03(A) (6) (2004) (requiring Maryland 
AIDS Drug Assistance Program providers to provide services without regard 
to sexual orientation); id. 1O.26.03.03(D)(5) (2004) (prohibiting licensees 
of the Board of Acupuncture from discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation); id. 10.34.1O.06(A)(1) (2004) (prohibiting pharmacists from 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.41.02.04(E) (2005) 
(prohibiting licensees of the Board of Examiners for Audiologists, Hearing 
Aid Dispensers, and Speech-Language Pathologists from discriminating on 
the basis of sexual orientation); id. 1O.42.03.03(B)(5) (2005) (prohibiting 
licensed social workers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion); id. 1O.43.14.03(D) (5) (2005) (prohibiting licensed chiropractors and 
registered chiropractic assistants of the Board of Chiropractic Examiners 
from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 
1O.43.18.03(D) (5) (2005) (prohibiting licensed massage therapists of the 
Board of Chiropractic Examiners from discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation); id. 10.46.02.01 (A) (l) (2005) (prohibiting licensees of the 
Board of Occupational Therapy Practice from discriminating on the basis 
of sexual orientation); id. 1O.47.01.07(C) (2005) (prohibiting a program 
administered under the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration from dis-
criminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.51.04.01 (C) (2) (x) 
(2005) (prohibiting providers of Maryland PrimaryCare from discriminat-
ing on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.53.01.01 (D)(5) (2005) 
(prohibiting an electrologist from discriminating on the basis of sexual ori-
entation); id. 10.5B.03.05(A) (2)(b) (2005) (prohibiting a counselor or 
therapist certified or licensed by the Board of Professional Counselors and 
Therapists from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 
1l.02 .04.02 (A) (2005) (mandating that departmen tal actions of the Depart-
ment of Transportation not discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion); id. 11.07.06.13 (2005) (mandating that proposals submitted to the 
Transportation Public-Private Partnership Program may not be subjected to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); id. l1.15.29.02(E)(6) 
(2005) (permitting the rejection of motor vehicle registration plates which 
"[c]ommunicates a message of any kind about" sexual orientation); id. 
13A.01.04.03 (2005) (guaranteeing a safe, adequate, and harassment-free 
educational environment for students without regard to sexual orientation 
in Maryland's public schools); id. 14.27.02.03(B) (2004) (calling for the 
implementation of an equal employment opportunity program in the Mary-
land Environmental Service to administer the human resources policies 
and provisions without discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); 
id. 14.29.04.09(C) (1) (2004) (prohibiting borrowers from the Maryland 
Heritage Areas Loan Program from discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation); id. 14.30.04.04(B)(3) (e) (i) (2004) (requiring election peti-
tions of employee organizations for the State Higher Education Labor Rela-
tions Board to certifY that they accept members without regard to sexual 
orientation); 27:23 Md. Reg. 2130 (Nov. 17, 2000) (executive order for 
commission to study sexual orientation discrimination in Maryland). 
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own local ordinances banning discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. 112 
Like the Antidiscrimination Act, these ordinances apply equally to 
both homosexuals and heterosexuals. Given the basic level of protec-
tion afforded by the Antidiscrimination Act, these county ordinances 
provide an additional barrier to sexual orientation prejudice that is 
both practical and symbolic in effect. Furthermore, they illustrate the 
pervasiveness of the orientation-blind principle in Maryland state and 
local law. 
For example, Howard County has enacted a panoply of anti-discrim-
ination measures focusing on sexual orientation both generallyl13 and 
in specific contexts including housing, employment, service by law en-
forcement, public accommodations, finance, and use of "open 
spaces"Y4 Prince George's County has similarly extended protections 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation in a variety of simi-
lar contexts as well as real estate and contractingY5 Baltimore City 
has also made efforts to ensure the equality of homosexuals with vari-
ous anti-discrimination measures concerning sexual orientation in-
cluding medical services and a program that tracks sexual orientation-
motivated hate crimesY6 Caroline County has passed an equal op-
portunity employment resolution that bans any discrimination against 
potential employees on the basis of sexual orientation.117 Lastly, 
Anne Arundel County has mandated that no sexual orientation dis-
crimination is to be permitted by cable franchisees. 118 
Perhaps some of the most far-reaching and innovative of these local 
ordinances can be found in Montgomery County, which has enacted 









See infra notes 113-21. 
HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE § 12.200 (1998) (prohibiting discrimination 
based on sexual orientation generally). 
[d. § 12.207 (housing discrimination); id. § 12.208 (employment discrimi-
nation); id. § 12.209 (discrimination by law enforcement personnel); id. 
§ 12.210 (public accommodation discrimination); id. § 12.211 (financing 
discrimination); id. § 19.513 (discrimination in use of "open space areas"). 
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE § 2-210 (2002) (housing discrimina-
tion); id. § 2-231.01 (commercial real estate discrimination); id. § 5A-ll7 
(cable franchise discrimination); id. § 10A-122 (contracting discrimina-
tion); id. § 16-101 (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation 
generally) . 
BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4 § 3-1 (2004) (prohibiting employment 
discrimination); id. § 3-2 (prohibiting public accommodations discrimina-
tion); id. § 3-3 (prohibiting education discrimination); id. § 3-4 (prohibit-
ing health and welfare agency discrimination); id. § 3-5 (prohibiting 
housing discrimination); id. art. 5, § 31-3 (providing for an annual review 
of licensed medical service providers to certify that they do not deny service 
on the basis of sexual orientation); id. art. 19, § 23-2 (providing for the 
tracking of hate crimes motivated by the victim's sexual orientation). 
CAROLINE COUNTY, MD., CODE app. II, Res. No. 93-008, § 1 (A) (2003). 
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD., CODE art. 13, § 2-811 (2004). 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-1 (2004). 
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along with many specific prohibitions similar to those established in 
other counties. 120 The County's most pioneering provision, however, 
is its extension of various rights and privileges to homosexual couples 
which were previously only enjoyed by heterosexual couples through 
the civil contract of marriage.121 The ordinances affecting this 
change, therefore, have considerable bearing on the argument for the 
equal enjoyment of the rights appurtenant to marriage by same-sex 
couples to be explored in the proceeding section. 
D. Montgomery County's Extension of Marriage-Like Benefits to Same-Sex 
Domestic Partnerships 
Perhaps the most profound development in the evolution of Mary-
land's sexual orientation-blind legal system that buttresses the argu-
ment for same-sex marriage rights is Montgomery County's extension 
of employment benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of County 
employees. 122 The Maryland Court of Appeals' unanimous vindica-
tion of the ordinance in litigation challenging its constitutionalityl23 
not only affirmed the emerging principle of orientation equality, but 
also signaled its stance on some important issues that may come to 
bear in Maryland's pending same-sex marriage lawsuit.124 
In Tyma v. Montgomery County, the court upheld the local ordinance 
granting domestic partnership benefits as a proper exercise of the 
powers delegated to the counties by the "Home Rule Amendment" to 
the Maryland Constitution. 125 In order to reach this decision, the 
court had to closely analyze the ordinance's purpose and effect to en-
sure that the county had not enacted a local law having an unduly 
120. Id. § 8A-15 (prohibiting cable franchise discrimination); id. § 27-11 
(prohibiting public accommodations discrimination); id. § 27-12 (prohibit-
ing housing discrimination); id. § 27-16 (prohibiting commercial real estate 
discrimination); id. § 27-19 (prohibiting employment discrimination); id. 
§ 27-22 (prohibiting discrimination through intimidation); id. app. D, 
§ 6.19 (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by licensees granted 
licenses by Board of Licensing Commission); see also Montgomery County 
Code of Regulations § 21.02.18.04 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination by 
fire rescue personnel); id. § 27.26.01.01 (including crimes committed 
against a person because of their sexual orientation as "hate crimes"); id. 
§ 33.07.01.05 (prohibiting employment discrimination in county 
operations) . 
121. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 33-22 (2004) (providing certain insur-
ance and financial benefits to same-sex domestic partnerships); id. § 52-24 
(extending tax exemption for property transfers to same-sex couples). 
122. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
123. Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 801 A.2d 148 (2002). 
124. Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-005390 (Cir. Ct. BaIt. City filed July 7, 
2004); see also text accompanying notes 136-37. 
125. Tyma, 369 Md. at 518,801 A.2d at 160 ("[W]e hold that a home rule county 
that provides benefits to the domestic partners of its employees does not 
exceed its local lawmaking authority or otherwise undermine State and fed-
eral law."). 
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general effect throughout the state.126 The court's inquiry indicated 
that the ordinance was, in fact, a local law and that the county had not 
exceeded its home rule power. 127 The court's analysis also focused on 
the ordinance's controversial effect in extending marriage-like bene-
fits to same-sex couples. 128 
In fact, the petitioners bringing the challenge in Tyma argued that 
the county ordinance was "an attempt to legitimize illegitimate rela-
tionships under Maryland law by attempting to create, in the guise of 
a benefits ordinance, a legal equivalency between lawful spouses and 
same-sex domestic partners."129 This characterization of the law was 
explicitly rejected by the court, which found that the law functioned 
only to extend similar benefits to domestic partners.130 
The ordinance, titled the Employee Benefits Equity Act of 1999, was 
enacted pursuant to the county's "long-standing policy, in law and 
practice, against employment discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion."131 In addition, the passage of the ordinance was motivated by 
the sense that "it is unfair to treat employees differently based solely 
on whether the employee's partner is legally recognized as a 
spouse."132 This rationale is essentially a recapitulation of the founda-
tional principles of the orientation-blind legal system. 133 The county 
recognized that it had developed a well-founded policy of preventing 
sexual orientation discrimination and created an affirmative benefit 
for same-sex partners to equalize them with their opposite-sex coun-
terparts. 134 This same extension of benefits should extend to same-
sex couples throughout the state based on the concept of fundamen-
tal fairness implicit in the sexual orientation-blind principle. 
Although the court's decision that the ordinance did not implicate 
the state's marriage laws135 did not give it the occasion to pass upon 
the constitutionality of Maryland's limitation of marriage to opposite-
126. [d. at 507-08, 801 A.2d at 153-54. 
127. [d. at 511, 801 A.2d at 156. 
128. [d. at 512, 514, 801 A.2d at 157-58. 
129. [d. at 509, 801 A.2d at 155. 
130. [d. at 514,801 A.2d at 158. 
131. [d. at 501, 801 A.2d at 150. 
132. [d. 
133. See supra text accompanying note 12 for a discussion of the principles of 
the orientation-blind system. 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32; see also MONTGOMERY COUNTY, 
MD., CODE § 33-22(a) (2004). 
135. Tyma, 369 Md. at 514,801 A.2d at 158 ("Nothing in the Act purports to, or 
can be construed to, create an alternate form of marriage, authorize com-
mon law marriage or create any legal relationship. Nor does the Act, by its 
terms or implication, restrict, modify or alter any rights incident to a mar-
riage recognized in this State .... "). The court, in neutral terms, noted 
earlier in the opinion that the county ordinance "does not infringe upon 
the Legislature's ability to regulate marriage on a statewide basis," without 
articulating whether the current regulation of marriage is constitutionally 
valid. [d. at 511, 801 A.2d at 156. 
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sex couples, Tyma was an important step forward. The decision up-
held a county-level scheme that created a legal institution for same-sex 
relationships much closer to marriage than anything currently availa-
ble under Maryland law. In that regard, the ordinance limits eligibil-
ity for domestic partnership to same-sex couples who, inter alia, "share 
a close personal relationship and [are] responsible for each other's 
welfare" and have shared the same legal residence for at least one 
year. I36 Indeed, the court recognized that" [t] 0 be sure, in the Act, 
the requirements for domestic partnership generally parallel those for 
marriage. "137 
And so, ultimately, the court recognized that the extension of bene-
fits to same-sex domestic partnerships was a valid exercise of the 
county's authority to provide for the general welfare of its citizens. I38 
This rationale would be particularly useful in application to the same-
sex marriage lawsuit currently being litigated in Maryland. Far from 
protecting the general welfare of the state, denying same-sex couples 
critical legal benefits I39 continues to significantly hinder their 
136. Id. at 502 n.4, 801 A.2d at 151 n.4 (citing MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE 
§ 32-22(c) (l)(A)-(C) (2004)). 
137. Id. at 514, 801 A.2d at 158. In fact, the qualifications for a domestic part-
nership under the ordinance appear to be even more stringent than those 
for marriage in the state. Compare MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 32-
22(c) (2004) (requiring, inter alia, partners to have shared a residence for 
one year and to "share sufficient financial and legal obligations"), with MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 2-201, 2-202, 2-301 (LexisNexis 2004) (requiring 
only that spouses be of the opposite sex, not be related by certain degrees 
of affinity or consanguinity, and be a certain age). 
138. Tyma, 369 Md. at 511, 801 A.2d at 156 ("Article 25A, § 5(S) of the Maryland 
Code, which implements [the Home Rule Amendment], authorizes counties 
... to enact 'such ordinances as may be expedient in maintaining the 
peace, good government, health and welfare of the county' that 'are not 
provided for by the public general law."'). 
139. In 1997, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported that federal 
law provided at least 1,049 benefits appurtenant to marriage. U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, GAO/OGC-97-16 at 1-2 
(1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf. The 
GAO upgraded that figure to 1,138 with the release of a new study in 2004. 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, GAO/OGC-04-
353R at 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. 
In Maryland, there are at least 339 benefits and obligations associated with 
marriage as codified in the Maryland Code according to the ACLU's plead-
ings in the Deane marriage equality case. Appendix to Plaintiffs' Memoran-
dum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment, 
Deane v. Conaway (Civ. No. 24-C-04-005390) (Cir. Ct. Bait. City June 14, 
2005) (on file with author); see infra Appendix. The more than 300 provi-
sions run the gamut of important financial, medical, familial, and personal 
matters. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 9-105, 9-106 (Lexis-
Nexis 2002) (establishes the marital communication and testimonial privi-
leges); EST. & TRUSTS § 3-102 (LexisNexis 2001) (assigns the spouse of a 
decedent first priority in intestate succession); FAM. LAw §§ 7-102, 7-103 
(LexisNexis 2004) (creates a cause of action for both limited and absolute 
divorce); id. §§ 8-203, 8-204, 8-205 (allows a court to determine the exis-
tence and value of marital property and grant a monetary award); id. §§ 11-
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welfare. 140 
III. THE MARRIAGE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE 
"ORIENTATION-BLIND" PRINCIPLE 
The preceding Part has discussed, at some length, the gradual and 
expansive evolution of sexual orientation blindness as a principle of 
Maryland law. This principle establishes that many crucial rights and 
privileges that were, at one time, only understood to protect or apply 
to heterosexuals or opposite-sex relationships are now extended 
equally to homosexuals and same-sex relationships.141 It is in the 
realm of substantive due process analysis, however, that the orienta-
tion-blind principle becomes legally actionable. In that analysis, the 
principle guides the court's descriptive and historical inquiries into 
fundamental rights,142 instructing that such rights should be con-
ceived without regard to sexual orientation. Of course, the funda-
mental substantive due process right at issue here is that of 
marriage,143 particularly marriage between same-s~x partners. 
A. Maryland Substantive Due Process 
In Maryland, substantive due process is enshrined in Article 24 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 144 which is read in the same man-
101, 11-106 (provides a cause of action for both definite and indefinite ali-
mony); HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (a) (2) (ii) (LexisNexis 2005) (allows a pa-
tient's spouse to make decisions about health care for an incapacitated 
spouse who has not elected a health care agent); INS. § 15-201 (c)(2) (ii) 
(LexisNexis 2002) (permits a spouse to add another spouse to an insurance 
policy on the application of either spouse); REAL PROP. § 4-108 (LexisNexis 
2003) (allows husband and wife to hold property as tenants by the entire-
ties and avoid straw deeds when transferring such property to another type 
of estate); TAX-GEN. § 7-203 (b) (2) (iii) (LexisNexis 2004) (creates the 
spousal exemption from the inheritance tax); id. § lO-807 (requires a mar-
ried couple who filed a joint federal income tax return to also file a joint 
Maryland income tax return). The full list of benefits and obligations is 
appended to this Comment. 
140. The detrimental effects of these myriad withheld benefits on same-sex 
couple families in Maryland are as diverse as the couples themselves. See, 
e.g., Stephanie Shapiro, Making a Case for Marriage, BALT. SUN,Jan. 23, 2005, 
at 6E; Susan Kinzie, Fighting for a Married Life Together in Md., WASH. POST, 
July 18, 2004, at T03. 
141. See supra Part II. 
142. See infra Part IIlAl. 
143. Dep't of Human Res. v. Thompson, 103 Md. App. 175, 197, 652 A.2d 1183, 
1193 (1995) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972» 
("Fundamental liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the 
c~:mstitution include 'n<;>~ merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
rIght ... to marry. . .. ). 
144. MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 24 (2002) ("That no man ought to be taken or 
imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, 
or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or 
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land."). 
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ner as the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause. 145 Maryland's Due Process Clause, though, is still ca-
pable of producing,146 and should produce, results different than 
those possible under the federal Constitution.147 It has been recog-
nized in Maryland that these different results may be more expansive 
in their bestowal of rights in cases where fundamental fairness dictates 
such a result. 148 On several occasions, the Court of Appeals has given 
an expanded reading of Article 24 compared to the federal Constitu-
tion. 149 The broader result suggested here is that Maryland substan-
tive due process should be guided by the sexual orientation equality 
principle explored above, thus requiring the recognition of same-sex 
marriage under the state constitution even though such recognition 
has not yet been achieved under the federal Constitution.150 
1. Tailoring Substantive Due Process Analysis to Maryland Law 
The seminal case of Washington v. Glucksberg,151 provides that asser-
tions of substantive due process rights are subjected to a two-pronged 








Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 77, 775 A.2d 1218, 1224 
(2001) . 
Aero Motors, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 274 Md. 567, 587, 337 A.2d 
685, 699 (1975) ("Although Art. [24] of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
has long 'been equated' with the 'due process' clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by judicial construction and application, the two provisions 
are not synonymous."). 
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977): 
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citi-
zens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitu-
tions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often 
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought fed-
erallaw to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent 
protective force of state law-for without it, the full realization of 
our liberties cannot be guaranteed. 
See also Att'y Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 705 n.9, 426 A.2d 929, 941 
n.9 (1981). 
Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91,175,786 A.2d 631, 681 (2001) (Raker,]., 
dissenting) ("Although this Court has generally interpreted Article 24 in 
pari materia with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we 
have interpreted it more broadly in instances where fundamental fairness 
demanded that we do so."). 
See id. (citing examples in the criminal context such as placing stricter lim-
its on prosecutorial discretion to enter nolle prosequi and the optional 
merger of criminal offenses). Maryland's due process clause has also been 
read more broadly than the federal constitution in granting the right to 
counsel. See Das v. Das, 133 Md. App. 1,28,754 A.2d 441, 456 (2000) (cit-
ing Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 358, 363, 464 A.2d 228, 234, 
237 (1983)). 
See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baker v. 
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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damentalliberty interest."152 The second prong of the Glucksberganal-
ysis prescribes a demonstration that the carefully described asserted 
right is "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. "'153 
While federal jurisprudence supplies the prevailing test for the exami-
nation of asserted substantive due process rights,154 the history, laws, 
and social climate of a particular state should color the application of 
Glucksberg in matters of state substantive due process rights. 155 
The analytical framework announced in Glucksberg has been 
adopted in Marylandl56 and is, therefore, appropriate to apply for the 
assertion of same-sex marriage rights under Maryland law. As dis-
cussed above, though, the Glucksberg analysis should be tailored pre-
cisely to the history and law of the jurisdiction where it is being 
applied to ensure that the result is true to that jurisdiction's particular 
circumstances.157 This tailoring should be done here and is only logi-
cal since Maryland constitutional law should be governed by Mary-
land's specific history and jurisprudence just as federal constitutional 
law is governed by national history and jurisprudence.158 
2. Maryland's Orientation-Blind System and the Careful Description 
of Same-Sex Marriage Rights 
The extensive development of sexual orientation equality in Mary-
land's decisional, statutory, and regulatory law greatly informs the 
"careful description" prong of the Glucksberg analysis. The litany of 
privileges and protections now equally available to homosexuals and 
heterosexuals in Maryland159 suggests that the conception of any legal 
right in the state should be described without regard to sexual orien-
tation. This is also the case with the careful description of the mar-
riage rights invoked by individuals that are part of a same-sex 









Id. at 720-21 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
Id. (citations omitted). 
See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. 
See Deems v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 101, 231 A.2d 514, 517 (1967); see 
generally Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons 
From Vermont's State Constitutional Case on Marriage oj Same-Sex Couples, 43 
B.C. L. REv. 73 (2001). 
Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md. App. 483, 537, 763 A.2d 209, 238 (2000). 
See, e.g., Standhardt v. Super. Ct. ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 
459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that "same-sex marriages are neither 
deeply rooted in the legal and social history of our Nation or state') (em-
phasis added); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 977 
(Mass. 2003) (Spina,]., dissenting) ("In this Commonwealth and in this coun-
try, the roots of the institution of marriage are deeply set in history as a civil 
union between a single man and a single woman.") (emphasis added). 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-2l. 
See supra Part II. 
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tion/60 enjoyment of child visitation rights,161 or invocation of the 
"battered spouse syndrome" defense162 is no longer dependent on 
one's orientation, one's enjoyment of the benefits and protections of 
civil marriage should no longer be predicated on one's orientation. 
In fact, the orientation-blind principle would suggest a description of 
same-sex marriage that is precisely the same as the description of op-
posite-sex marriage: the right to marry the person of your choice. 163 
Logically, this conception reflects common sense as well as legal 
reasoning and is universally applicable to other fundamental rights. 
One would not carefully describe a gay man or lesbian's free speech 
rights as the "right to homosexual free speech." Such a formulation is 
inapposite since we do not conceive of that right in terms of sexual 
orientation because it is immaterial to its exercise. In the same way, 
Maryland law has been removing sexual orientation from the concep-
tion of legal rights with increasing scope under the rationale that ori-
entation has no bearing on those rights. 164 
Indeed, to carefully describe the marriage rights of same-sex 
couples as separate and distinct from the rights of opposite-sex 
couples would be to make the same kind of misapprehension made by 
the United States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick165 concerning 
the rights of homosexuals.166 Just seventeen years after Bowers, the 
Court rectified this misapprehension in Lawrence v. Texas. 167 There, 
the Court indicated that Bowers was wrong when it was decided and 
that the Court had "misapprehended the claim of liberty there 
presented to it."168 To be sure, the claim of liberty to marry asserted 
by homosexuals is not a new or separate right, but is rather an exer-
cise of the choice contemplated by the privacy of marital decisions.169 
3. Marital Choice and the History Prong of Substantive Due Process 
Analysis 
Certainly, it has been well-established in constitutional jurispru-
dence that the right to marriage is not only deeply rooted in the Na-












See supra note 98. 
See supra Part ILA.l. 
See supra Part 1I.B.2. 
See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
See supra Part II. 
478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
ld. at 190 ("The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers 
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy .... "). 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). See also supra Part II.B.I. 
ld. at 567. The Lawrence majority further noted that the Bowers Court's for-
mulation of the issue in that case "disclose[d] the Court's own failure to 
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake." ld. 
See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (quoting Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)) ("The freedom to marry has long been recog-
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fundamental right. 171 If this fundamental right to marry means any-
thing, it must mean that one has the right to choose the person he or 
she truly desires to marry, including someone of the same sex, lest it 
lose its quality as a right. I72 The Court has reiterated this right and 
"long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of mar-
riage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Arnendment."173 
Maryland's current statutory scheme necessarily abridges this per-
sonal choice aspect of marriage for homosexuals wishing to marry 
their same-sex partner. Although homosexuals are permitted to 
marry, they may only do so provided they marry a person of the oppo-
site sex. 174 This Hobson's choice frustrates the natural dynamic of 
intimate relationships and the essence of the freedom of choice. 
Under this scheme, the personal preferences of homosexuals are 
wrongfully disregarded and subjugated in favor of an exclusively het-
erosexual paradigm. 175 
To illustrate, imagine that the status quo was reversed and the Mary-
land statute permitted only same-sex marriage. Because the statute au-
tomatically eliminates the possibility of an opposite-sex spouse, the 
inclination of a heterosexual man to marry a woman would be stifled. 
This scheme, like the current one in Maryland, unfairly establishes a 
conception of the right to marry in terms of orientation, which in 
practicality ignores a significant portion of the population'S natural 
preferences. I 76 
A similar problem was encountered almost forty years ago with re-








nized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men."). 
Id. at 383-85 (reciting the history of marriage's place as a fundamental right 
and the protections appurtenan t thereto); see also In re Matthew R., 113 Md. 
App. 701, 721, 688 A.2d 955, 964 (1997). 
Cf Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the 
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimina-
tions. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a per-
son of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by 
the State."). 
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 385 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)). 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2004). 
See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, 
BREAD, AND POETRY: SELECTED PROSE 1979-1985, at 23 (W. W. Norton 1986) 
(1980). 
Simon LeVay & Dean H. Hamer, Evidence for a Biological Influence in Male 
Homosexuality, in THE SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN BOOK OF THE BRAIN 171 (The 
Lyons Press 1999); see also Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampj, or, 
How America Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans 
Didn't, 49 DUKE LJ. 1559, 1568 n.43 (2000) (noting that "ten percent is the 
figure frequently cited as the percentage of homosexual men in the U.S. 
population .... "). 
388 U.S. at 1. 
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ginia's miscegenation statute motivated by an unconstitutional racist 
paradigm of white supremacy.178 Just as the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Federal Constitution was offended by a restriction of marriage 
rights based upon race in Loving, 179 so too is Maryland's Equal Protec-
tion Clause180 violated by the limitation of marriage rights based on 
sexual orientation in light of the orientation-blind principle. 181 
The decision of two gay men or lesbians to marry one another is 
conceptually no different from that of Mildred Jeter and Richard Lov-
ing's interracial marriage. 182 In fact, their similarities are notably in-
structive. At the time the Lovings were married in another 
jurisdiction, interracial marriage was far from being "deeply rooted in 
this Nation's history and tradition" as Glucksberg requires today.183 In-
deed, the Court observed that Virginia was one of sixteen states 
prohibiting interracial marriagesl84 and the lower state court's opin-
ion explaining the Loving's conviction cited an established history 
178. Id. at 11-12. 
179. Id. at 12 ("There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry 
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause."). 
180. Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 417, 635 A.2d 967, 970 (1994) 
("[Ilt is well established that Article 24 [of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights] embodies the same equal protection concepts found in the Four-
teenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."). Like the Due Process 
Clause of the Declaration of Rights, Maryland's equal protection doctrine is 
capable of divergent interpretation from the federal provision. Id. ("We 
have consistently recognized that the federal Equal Protection Clause and 
the Article 24 guarantee of equal protection of the laws are complementary 
but independent, and 'a discriminatory classification may be an unconstitu-
tional breach of the equal protection doctrine under the authority of Arti-
cle 24 alone.''') (quoting Att'y Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 715, 426 A.2d 
929,947 (1981)). Again, like the due process clause, the equal protection 
ensured by "Article 24 acts to vindicate important personal rights protected 
by the Maryland Constitution or those recognized as vital to the history and 
traditions of the people of this State." Waldron, 289 Md. at 715, 426 A.2d at 
947. The sexual orientation-blind legal principle that has bestowed so 
many legal rights to homosexuals in the state has become one of those such 
traditions. 
181. Although a popular argument in favor of same-sex marriage, the analogy 
between same-sex marriage and interracial marriage in Loving has been the 
subject of fierce public debate. Compare Josephine Ross, The Sexualization oj 
Difference: A Comparison oj Mixed-Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARv. 
c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 255,271-79 (2002) (pointing to social science data indicat-
ing that same-sex couples and mixed-race couples experience comparable 
reactions to their non-traditional choice of mate), with David Orgon Coo-
lidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics oj Analogy, 12 
BYU J. PUB. L. 201, 204, 235-38 (1998) (arguing that those who advocate 
same-sex marriage using the "Loving analogy" are making a political state-
ment rather than a legal argument). 
182. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
183. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
184. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6. Moreover, Virginia's anti-miscegenation law had a 
considerably long history, dating back to the colonial period. Id. 
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and tradition of separating the races, particularly with respect to 
marriage. 185 
A similar body of statutory, case, and constitutional law prohibiting 
same-sex marriage exists across the country186 as it does in Maryland. 
This orientation-driven restriction of marriage rights, however, is vul-
nerable to the same defect as the statute invalidated in Loving. Mary-
land's orientation-blind principle demonstrates that the state's 
heterosexual paradigm of marriage rights is repugnant to the equal 
protection of the rights of all orientations. Loving also teaches that 
outmoded and inequitable historical, social, and legal conventions 
cannot restrain the fundamental right to marry. While Maryland's le-
gal history has not specifically recognized same-sex marriage, other 
critical aspects of the law have discarded the stubborn historical con-
ventions that restrain other rights and protections of homosexuals.187 
The significant developments of the sexual orientation-blind evolu-
tion also provide the "crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmak-
ing . . . that direct and restrain . . . exposition of the Due Process 
Clause" by its simple directive to equalize the rights and protections 
afforded Maryland citizens across artificial sexual orientation lines.188 
B. The Evolution oj Liberty 
The equalization of same-sex marriage rights with those of heter-
osexuals merely requires an acknowledgement of the already ex-
panding notions of liberty in Maryland law. 189 As the Lawrence Court 
explained in its decision, the notion of liberty and the rights recog-
nized under it evolve and expand over time. 190 In fact, the Supreme 
Court has often emphasized the importance of the evolution of liberty 
and due process.191 One representative example of this emphasis 
185. Id. at 3: 
'Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay 
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for 
the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for 
such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he 
did not intend for the races to mix.' 
186. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Marriage Between Persons of Same Sex, 81 
A.L.R.5TH 1, §§ 3-10 (2000). 
187. See supra Part II. 
188. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 
125 (1992» (citation omitted). 
189. See supra Part II. 
190. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) ("As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom."). 
191. Justice Brennan once wrote: 
[T] he genius of our Constitution resides not in any static 
meaning that it had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the 
adaptability of its great principles to cope with the problems of a 
developing Anlerica. A principle to be vital must be of wider appli-
cation than the mischief that gave it birth. Constitutions are not 
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comes from Frank v. Maryland: 192 
[W]hat free people have found consistent with their enjoy-
ment of freedom for centuries is hardly to be deemed to vio-
late due process, does not freeze due process within the 
confines of historical facts or discredited attitudes. 'It is of 
the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of 
what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it 
does a living principle, due process is not confined within a 
permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed 
the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.'193 
This concept is echoed in the realm of equal protection in Harper v. 
Virginia State Board of Elections: 194 
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the politi-
cal theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are 
unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been con-
fined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have 
restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a 
given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights. 
Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of 
the Equal Protection Clause do change. 195 
In 1973, a federal district court in Maryland arguably signaled the 
beginning of the state's evolution of liberty with respect to homosexu-
als in Acanfora v. Board of Education. 196 There, the court found that 
"private, consenting, adult homosexuality" should be constitutionally 
protected197 as a valid social relationship not to be restricted by the 
government.198 Underlying this holding was an understanding that 
liberty evolves with experience l99 and that resistance to changing mo-
res inhibits the full realization of liberty.20o 
ephemeral documents, designed to meet passing occasions. The 
future is their care, and therefore, in their application, our con-
templation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. 
Brennan, supra note 147, at 495. 
192. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
193. Id. at 371 (quoting Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949». 
194. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
195. Id. at 669 (citation omitted). Put another, more illustrative, way by the 
Ninth Circuit: "[C]onstitutional concepts of equal protection are not im-
mutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian amber." Dillenburg v. 
Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972). 
196. 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), affd 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974). 
197. Id. at 85l. 
198. Id. at 850-5l. 
199. Id. at 851 (" 'Great concepts like ... liberty ... were purposely left to gather 
meaning from experience. For they relate to the whole domain of social 
and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too 
well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.''') (quoting Nat'l Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1973) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting». 
200. Id. ("Intolerance of the unconventional halts the growth of liberty."). 
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Without decisions like that in Acanfora and the recognition of 
trends like that embodied by the sexual orientation-blind principle in 
Maryland, the Maryland Declaration of Rights cannot be fulfilled for 
the state's almost 13,000 same-sex couples.201 A rote reliance on the 
history's dated conception of fundamental rights not only impairs the 
natural evolution of liberty, but also defies reason. This is never more 
apparent than in the argument against the recognition of same-sex 
marriage, particularly with respect to the history prong of the Gluck-
sberg analysis. 
A typical objection to same-sex marriage as a fundamental right can 
be found in Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa. 202 In 
that case, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that due process did 
not contemplate the recognition of same-sex marriage as a fundamen-
tal right.203 The court's analysis of same-sex marriage in light of the 
right to marry demonstrates the illogic of its conclusion. The court 
opined that "[a]lthough same-sex relationships are more open and 
have garnered greater societal acceptance in recent years, same-sex 
marriages are neither deeply rooted in the legal and social history of 
our Nation or state nor are they implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty. "204 This reliance on a historical absence of same-sex marriage 
presents a dizzying circular argument. In essence, the argument goes 
as such: same-sex marriage cannot be recognized because there is no 
legal or social history of such a practice, and the reason that practice 
does not exist is because there is no legal or social history of same-sex 
marriage. 
The Standhardt court simply fails to acknowledge what the Supreme 
Court has reiterated with respect to evolving fundamental rights205_ 
that they must, at some point, have a recognized time and point of 
origin. Quite often, it is the judiciary, the final arbiters of the Consti-
tution, who acknowledge the emergence of these rights.206 There-
fore, the court's absolute dependence on the lack of a legal history of 
same-sex marriage as rationale for denying that right is an abrogation 
of its duty. Standhardt's denial of same-sex marriage rights is even 
more perplexing given that the court is willing to concede that homo-
sexual couples have gained considerable social recognition207-a vital 
component of the historical analysis on which the court relied. 
201. See supra note 8. 
202. 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
203. Id. at 460 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21). 
204. Id. at 459. 
205. See supra Part III.B. 
206. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) ("The power to inter-
pret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary."); see 
also Hillman v. Stockett, 183 Md. 641, 645, 39 A.2d 803, 805 (1944) ("It is 
the province and the duty of the Courts to interpret the Constitution .... "). 
207. See supra note 204. 
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In sum, the proper careful description of same-sex marriage rights 
and their foundation in the historical right to marital choice militates 
their recognition. The Glucksberg Court opined in setting forth its two-
prong test that "[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices 
thus provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,' 
that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.''208 
Similarly, Maryland's adaptation of the Glucksberg test should analyze 
the assertion of the right to marry by same-sex couples in light of Ma-
ryland's history, legal tradition, and practice which, as discussed above, 
establishes a trend of orientation equality supportive of such a right. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For over a decade, a trend has developed in Maryland law favoring 
the equality of homosexuals and heterosexuals in significant respects. 
The sweep of this trend covers crucial aspects of the family relation-
ship and the rights of parents,209 important recognitions of the homo-
sexual lifestyle in criminal law,210 and ground-breaking state and local 
anti-discrimination measures.211 All of these developments, taken to-
gether, amounts to a "sexual orientation-blind" concept of parity that 
has equalized the legal rights and protections of both homosexuals 
and heterosexuals. 
This "orientation-blind" principle informs critical aspects of sub-
stantive due process analysis governing the interpretation of funda-
mental rights like marriage.212 The principle first illustrates that the 
exercise of same-sex marriage rights does not involve the creation of a 
new right, but rather the recognition of a form of the already well-
founded right to marry.213 Second, the recognition of same-sex mar-
riage is supported by case law discussing the importance of evolving 
standards of due process and the expansion of historically-founded 
fundamental rights. 214 Under this analysis, then, Maryland's statutory 
scheme denying same-sex couples the right to marry is 
unconstitutional. 
Gregory Carffl' 
208. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citation omitted). 
209. See supra Part II.A. 
210. See supra Part II.B. 
211. See supra Part 1I.c. 
212. See supra Part I1IAL 
213. See supra Part 1I1.A.2. 
214. See supra Part 1I1.A.3. 
* J.D. expected May 2006, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., 
Lycoming College, 2003. 
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APPENDIX ONE: BENEFITS AND OBLIGATIONS GRANTED TO 
MARRIED COUPLES AND THEIR CHILDREN BUT DENIED TO 
SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THEIR CHILDREN BY MARYLAND LAW 
No. Provision Citation Description of Provision 
1 Agriculture § 2-603 (b) (2) Grants spouses joint and several eligibility for the 
Farmer Disaster Loan Program 
2 Business Occupations and Prohibits lawyers from soliciting personal injury or 
Professions § 10-605.1 (b) wrongful death clients who are relatives to the injured 
party until thirty days have passed since the accident 
or disaster 
3 Business Occupations and Prohibitions on lawyer communications and advertise-
Professions § 10- ments to potential personal injury and wrongful death 
605.2(a)(1) clients related to the injured party 
4 Business Occupations and Upon a real estate broker's death, family members may 
Professions § 17-319(a)-(d) carry on the business for six months and may also quali-
fy for the license itself 
5 Business Occupations and Not more than 50% of the interest in a real estate 
Professions § 17- business may be held by associate brokers or salesper-
511 (a)( 4)(i)-(b) (2) sons, unless these individuals are a spouse, parent, 
child, sibling, stepparent, stepchild, or stepsibling af-
filiated with the business 
6 Business Regulations § S- A trustee of a cemetery may not use any trust funds 
603(c) to either purchase an interest in any contract or 
agreement to which his spouse is a party; or make any 
loan or investment to his spouse or to any entity or 
business owned or under the control of his spouse 
7 Business Regulations § 7- A collection agency license may be denied if the ap-
303(b)(4) plicant's spouse has had a license revoked or is re-
sponsible for the revocation of a license 
8 Business Regulations § 8- Providing that "[a] claim against the [Home Improve-
405(f) (1) ment Guaranty] Fund based on the act or omission of 
a particular contractor may not be made by ... a 
spouse or other immediate relative of the contractor," 
or by "an immediate relative of an employee, officer, 
or partner of the contractor.» 
9 Business Regulations §§ 11- Requires a person who has been granted horse racing 
301 (4), 11-314(a) days for a given year to show the beneficial ownership 
of their stock, which includes ownership of a security 
by a relative of the individual who lives in the same 
home 
10 Business Regulations § 17- If a general business licensee dies, "the surviving 
308 spouse or personal representative ... may do business 
under the license for the rest of the term of the li-
cense." 
11 Business Regulations § 19- Grants spousal rights to wear the insignia of fraternal 
207(b)(1)-(2) and patriotic organizations 
12 Commercial Law §§ 9- States that, for the purposes of secured transactions, a 
102(a) (63), 9-602(8) "debtor or obligor may not waive or vary the rules" of 
calculating "a deficiency or surplus when a disposition 
is made to ... a person related to the secured party," 
including a spouse and any other relative by blood or 
marriage 
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No. Provision Citation Description of Provision 
13 Commercial Law §§ 9- States that, for the purposes of secured transactions, 
102(a)(63), 9-615(f) (1) "[tlhe surplus or deficiency following a disposition is 
calculated based on the amount of proceeds that 
would have been realized in a disposition complying 
with this part to ... a person related to the secured 
party," including a spouse and any other relative by 
blood or marriage, if "[tlhe transferee in the disposi-
tion is ... a person related to the secured party." 
14 Commercial Law §§ 9- States that in any "action arising from a transaction in 
102(a)(63), 9-626(5) which the amount of a deficiency or surplus is in is-
sue" and "a deficiency or surplus is calculated," then 
the burden of establishing that the amount of pro-
ceeds of the disposition is considerably below the 
price range "that a complying disposition to a person 
other than ... a person related to the secured party," 
including a spouse or any other relative by blood or 
marriage, would have brought rests on the debtor or 
obligor 
15 Commercial Law § 12-705 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act's prohibited dis-
criminatory practices include refusing to recognize 
the legal name of a married individual, refusing to 
consider both applicants' income when both parties 
of a marriage apply for a joint account, refusing to is-
sue separate accounts to married persons where each 
is creditworthy, and requesting or considering the 
credit rating of the applicant's spouse where the ap-
plicant is not applying for ajoint account 
16 Commercial Law § 15-302 For the purposes of debt collection, "[aln assignment 
of wages by a married person is not valid unless also 
executed and acknowledged by the assignor's spouse." 
17 Corporations and Associa- If spouses hold ajoint membership in an electric co-
tions § 5-622 operative, "either one, but not both, may be elected 
as a director." 
IS Corporations and Associa- Exempts a transfer between spouses from the general 
tions § 5-6IUlS(a)(l), rule that a local government has the righ t of first 
(c) (7) purchase of any rental facility being purchased for 
purposes of conversion 
19 Correctional Services § 3- States that, "[ulnder the extended work-release pro-
S07(b) gram, an inmate who is sentenced ... for desertion 
or nonsupport of a spouse, child, or destitute parent 
may be granted the privilege of leaving actual con-
finement." 
20 Correctional Services § 3- "On application of a relative, the body of an executed 
909(a) inmate shall be returned to the relative at the rela-
tive's cost." 
21 Correctional Services § 9- Custody of a baby born to an inmate may be granted 
601(e)(I) to the father or other relative 
22 Courts and Judicial Proce- Supplementation of a judge's salary is prohibited, in-
dure § 1-705 c1uding any payment from a political subdivision to 
the surviving spouse of the judge 
23 Courts and Judicial Pro- The Calvert County Commission may provide a pen-
ceedings § 2-309(f) (5)(i) sion to be paid to the surviving spouse of a county 
sheriff 
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No. Provision Citation Description of Provision 
24 Courts and Judicial Pro- A "husband may maintain an action of slander against 
ceedings § 3-502(b) any person for words spoken falsely and maliciously 
about his wife for her character or reputation for 
chastity before or during the marriage." 
25 Courts and Judicial Pro- A wrongful death action "shall be for the benefit of 
ceedings § 3-904(a)-(b) the wife, husband, parent, and child of the deceased 
person." If none of these persons exist, "an action 
shall be for the benefit of any person related to the 
deceased person by blood or marriage who was sub-
stantially dependent upon the deceased." 
26 Courts and Judicial Pro- Provides that, "a civil action for damages for the 
ceedings § 3-1603 death of an individual caused by the individual's use 
of a controlled dangerous substance may be brought 
... by a parent, legal guardian, child, spouse, or sib-
ling of the individual." 
27 Courts and Judicial Pro- The Statute of Frauds bestows the right to sue on an 
ceedings § 5-901 (2) agreement made in consideration of marriage, if writ-
ten evidence of it exists and is signed by the allegedly 
breaching party 
28 Courts and Judicial Pro- The venue for an adoption proceeding may be the 
ceedings § 6-203(e)(4) place in which "[tlhe person to be adopted is domi-
ciled, if he is related to the petitioner by blood or 
marriage." 
29 Courts and Judicial Pro- Under certain circumstances, former members of the 
ceedings § 7-406 armed forces and their family members are entitled 
to copies of court records, including marriage 
records, without charge 
30 Courts and Judicial Pro- The juror qualification form asks about the occupa-
ceedings § 8- tion of the potential juror's spouse 
202(5) (i) (1) (c) 
31 Courts and Judicial Pro- Confidential communications between spouses are 
ceedings § 9-105 privileged information 
32 Courts and Judicial Pro- A spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be 
ceedings § 9-106 compelled to testify, with some exceptions. If the 
spouse refused to testify in any case where the spouse 
was the victim, the court clerk must make a record of 
the refusal, and when a request for expungement in 
an assault case is made, the record of the spouse's re-
fusal is not expunged 
33 Courts & Judicial Proceed- Includes marital care in the category of noneconomic 
ings § 11-108 (a)(2)(i) (2) damages 
34 Criminal Law § 7- It is a defense to the crime of theft that the property 
110(c)(3) involved was the defendant's spouse's property, unless 
at the time of the alleged theft they were living in 
separate residences 
35 Criminal Procedure § 11- If the victim of a violent crime dies, a spouse, surviv-
103 ing spouse, child, or sibling, parent, or legal guardian 
may file, in the case against the defendant, an appli-
cation for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Ap-
peals from an interlocutory or final order that denies 
or fails to consider various rights secured to the vic-
tim 
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No. Provision Citation Description of Provision 
36 Criminal Procedure § 11- For the purposes of restitution for a crime against a 
602(2) burial site under Criminal Law § 10-404, a person re-
lated by blood or marriage to a person buried may 
act on behalf of the victim of a crime 
37 Criminal Procedure § 11- A victim's spouse and dependents-defined in § 11-
SOS SOl as spouses, children, and others principally sup-
ported by the victim-under certain circumstances 
are eligible for awards under the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board 
3S Criminal Procedure § 11- In addition to monetary awards from the Criminal In-
S11(a)(5) juries Compensation Board, a parent, child, or spouse 
of a victim is eligible "to receive psychiatric, psycho-
logical, or mental health counseling." 
39 Criminal Procedure §§ 11- Entides a victim's representative, which includes a 
1001 (f), 11-1002 spouse, child, sibling, or parent of a victim of a crime, 
to certain notices, services, and treatment during the 
investigation and prosecution of a crime 
40 Criminal Procedure §§ 11- Entides a victim's representative, which includes a 
1001 (f), 11-1003 spouse, child, sibling, or a parent of a victim of a 
crime, to certain notices, services, and treatment dur-
ing the investigation and prosecution of a juvenile 
crime 
41 Education § 3-58-02 A spouse may not serve on the Frederick County 
Board of Education if the other spouse is an adminis-
trator or teacher in the district. Conversely, a spouse 
may not be hired as an administrator or teacher in 
the district if the other spouse serves on the Board, 
unless the board member first resigns 
42 Education § 4-122.1 Specifies special educational provisions for children in 
"informal kinship care relationships," which are living 
arrangements in which a relative-defined as an adult 
related to the child by blood or marriage within the 
fifth degree of consanguinity-of a child "provides for 
the care and custody of the child due to a serious 
family hardship." 
43 Education § 7-101 (b)(l) Provides that, "each child shall attend a public school 
in the county where the child is domiciled with the 
child's parent, guardian, or relative providing infor-
mal kinship care." 
44 Education § 15-106.4 The spouse of an active duty member of the armed 
forces is exempt from paying nonresident tuition at a 
public institution of higher education 
45 Education § 18- Surviving spouses are eligible to apply for the Edward 
601 (d) (3) (iii) (2) T. Conroy Memorial Scholarship Program 
46 Education § 18-1009 (re- Deferment from repayment of higher education loans 
pealed by the Higher Edu- is authorized for up to three years, during which the 
cation Loan Corporation borrower is unable to secure employment by reason 
and Program - Repeal, of care required by a spouse who is disabled; if both 
2005 Md. Laws 1114). spouses have loans, then both spouses payments are 
combined in order to satisfy the minimum total annu-
al payment 
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No. Provision Citation Description of Provision 
47 Election Law § 13-231 States that, "[clontributions or loans to a campaign fi-
nance entity of a candidate from the personal funds 
of the ... candidate's spouse are not subject to the 
contribution limits under § 13-226 .... " The section 
also states that "[elxpenditures from personal funds 
by the ... candidate's spouse for personal expenses 
of the candidate for filing fees, telecommunication 
services, travel, and food are not contributions." 
48 Election Law § 13- Provides that, "[plublication expenses may be paid 
408(b)(2) from ... the personal funds of the ... spouse of the 
incumbent," under certain circumstances 
49 Election Law § 14- For the purposes of disclosure, a contribution does 
101 (f) (2)(i) not include "a bona fide gift by a spouse or relative 
within the third degree of consanguinity." 
50 Environment §§ 6-801, 6- Prohibits any person performing lead-contaminated 
818(a)( 1 )(ii) dust testing or conducting an inspection to be a relat-
ed party to the owner, which includes any person re-
lated to an owner by blood or marriage 
51 Estates and Trusts § 1-202 A surviving spouse is defined as: no person who has 
received an absolute divorce from the decedent or 
whose marriage was annulled; no person who partici-
pates in a marriage ceremony with a third person, af-
ter a decree or judgment of divorce or annulment ob-
tained by the decedent; no person convicted of biga-
m}'while married to the decedent 
52 Estates and Trusts § 1-205 Defines a child as "a legitimate child, and adopted 
child, and an illegitimate child to the extent provided 
in §§ 1-206 through 1-208 of this title. A child does 
not include a stepchild, foster child, or a grandchild 
or more remote descendant." 
53 Estates and Trusts §§ 1- Defines issue as "every living lineal descendant except 
205, 1-209 a lineal descendant of a living lineal descendant." Le-
gitimate, adopted, and illegitimate children are con-
sidered lineal descendants 
54 Estates and Trusts § 2-108 The surviving spouse of every elected judge of the 
Court of Baltimore City shall be paid one half of the 
pension to which his spouse was entitled at the time 
of this death, provided certain requirements are met 
55 Estates and Trusts § 3-102 In the event of intestate succession, the sury.;ving 
spouse is provided at least a fractional share of the 
decedent's estate; if there is no other surviving issue 
or parent, the spouse is entitled to the whole estate 
56 Estates and Trusts § 3- In the event of intestate succession, if there is no sur-
104(e) viving spouse and no surviving blood relative entitled 
to inherit, the estate shall be divided into equal 
shares for the stepchildren of the decedent; stepchild 
means the child of any spouse of the decedent if such 
spouse was not divorced from the decedent 
57 Estates and Trusts § 3- In the event of intestate succession, "[tlhe surviving 
201 (a) spouse is entitled to receive an allowance of $5,000 
for personal use." 
58 Estates and Trusts § 3- Provides that, "[il nstead of property left to the surviv-
203(b) ing spouse by will, the surviving spouse may elect to 
take a one-third share of the net estate if there is also 
a surviving issue, or a one-half share ... if there is 
not a surviving issue." 
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59 Estates and Trusts § 4- The event of a marriage followed by the birth or 
105(3) adoption of a child by the testator subsequent to the 
execution of a will effects to revoke the will 
60 Estates and Trusts § 4-401 Spousal exception to the general rule that a legatee 
who fails to smvive the testator by thirty days is con-
sidered to have predeceased the testator, unless other-
wise provided in the will 
61 Estates and Trusts §§ 4- Provides that, if an anatomical gift "is only a part of 
501(d),4-508(a) the body, promptly following the removal of the part 
named, custody of the remaining parts of the body 
shall be transferred to the next of kin," which in-
cludes a spouse 
62 Estates and Trusts §§ 4- States that, "[t]he Chief Medical Examiner, the depu-
501(d),4-509(a) ty chief medical examiner, or an assistant medical ex-
aminer may provide an organ or tissue upon the re-
quest of the federally designated organ procurement 
organization or tissue bank" if, inter alia, "[a] reasona-
ble, unsuccessful search has been made by the treat-
ing physician and the hospital where the patient is lo-
cated to contact the next of kin [including a spouse] 
... [and] [n]o objection by the next of kin is known 
by the medical examiner." 
63 Estates and Trusts §§ 4- States that, if there is a need for corneal tissue for ei-
501(d),4-509.1(a)(3) ther transplant or research, "the Chief Medical Exam-
iner, the deputy chief medical examiner, or an assis-
tant medical examiner shall provide the cornea upon 
the request of the Medical Eye Bank of Maryland, In-
corporated, or the Lions of District 22-C Eye Bank 
and Research Foundation, Incorporated," if the next 
of kin does not make his or her objection known to 
the medical examiner 
64 Estates and Trusts § 4- In the event that a decedent has not made a gift of 
503(b) (1) all or part of the decedent's body, and not expressed 
otherwise, a surviving spouse has first priority in de-
ciding whether or not to donate all or part of the 
body. 
65 Estates and Trusts § 4-504 A donee "hospital, surgeon, or physician that receives 
a gift for the purpose of a transplantation may not 
bill the estate of the donor, a surviving spouse of the 
donee, any heirs of the donor, or an insurer of the 
donor for the costs associated with the removal of the 
gift." 
66 Estates and Trusts § 5- In granting letters in administrative or judicial pro-
104(3) bate, or in appointing a successor personal represen-
tative, or a special administrator, spouses are given 
third priority only subsequent to "personal representa-
tives named in a will admitted to probate" and "per-
sonal representatives nominated in accordance with a 
power conferred in a will admitted to probate." 
67 Estates and Trusts § 5-105 Spousal exception to the general rule that letters may 
not be granted to non-citizens 
68 Estates and Trusts § 5-601 Non-spouse can avoid probate when the estate has 
value of $30,000 or less; if the surviving spouse is the 
sole legatee or heir, he or she can avoid probate 
when the estate has value of $50,000 or less 
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69 Estates and Trusts § 5- Provides that, "[aln election for modified administra-
702(2) tion may be filed by personal representative of an es-
tate within 3 months from the date of appointment" 
if among other things, "[alII trustees of each trust 
that is a residuary legatee are limited to the dece-
dent's: Personal representative; Surviving spouse; and 
Children." 
70 Estates and Trusts § 9-103 Bequests to non-spouses are more vulnerable to abate-
ment than bequests to spouses 
71 Estates and Trusts § 11- Authorizes fiduciary to exercise discretion to maxi-
106(a) mize estate tax marital deduction 
72 Estates and Trusts § 13-207 A spouse is automatically third in line to be ap-
pointed as guardian for a minor or disabled person, 
and may be elevated to first or second 
73 Estates and Trusts §§ 13- States that, if no custodian has been nominated 
301(j),13-307(c) under the Maryland Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, 
or all persons so nominated as custodian die before 
the transfer or are unable, decline, or are ineligible 
to serve, a transfer under this section may be made to 
an adult member of the minor's family, which in-
cludes the minor's parents, stepparent, spouse, grand-
parent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt, whether of 
whole or half blood or by adoption, or to a trust com-
pany unless the property exceeds $10,000 in value 
74 Estates and Trusts §§ 13- States that, if a custodian is ineligible, dies, or be-
301 (j), 13-318(d)(l) comes incapacitated without having effectively desig-
nated a successor and the minor has attained the age 
of 14 years, the minor may designate as successor cus-
todian an adult member of the minor's family, which 
includes the minor's parents, stepparent, spouse, 
grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt, whether 
of whole or half blood or by adoption 
75 Estates and Trusts §§ 13- States that, a minor who has attained the age of 14 
301 (j), 13-318(d) (3) years, an adult member of the minor's family, which 
includes the minor's parents, stepparent, spouse, 
grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt, whether 
of whole or half blood or by adoption, may petition 
the court for an accounting by the custodian or the 
custodian's legal representative; or a determination of 
responsibility, as between the custodial property and 
the custodian personally, for claims against the custo-
dial property unless the responsibility has been adju-
dicated in an action under § 13-317 of this subtitle to 
which the minor or the minor's legal representative 
was a party 
76 Estates and Trusts § 13- States that, "[al minor who holds title to property as 
503(a) a tenant by the entirety with a spouse who has 
reached the age of majority is authorized to join with 
the spouse in any deed ... note, or financing state-
ment in the same manner and effect as an adult." 
77 Estates and Trusts § 13-707 A disabled person's spouse is automatically third in 
line to be appointed guardian, and may be expressly 
elevated higher 
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78 Estates and Trusts § 14-104 Prohibits a judge of any court or any clerk of court or 
register of wills from serving as a trustee of any inter 
vivos or testamentary trust "unless he is the surviving 
spouse of the grantor of the trust." 
79 Estates and Trusts § 14-107 A trust may not be terminated under this section if 
the trust would be eligible for the marital deduction 
from the federal estate tax or for federal gift tax pur-
poses under the IRS Code, "unless all beneficiaries 
agree that all of the trust estate shall be distributed to 
the spouse of the creator of the trust." 
80 Estates and Trusts § 14-109 Various restrictions on a trustee's powers do not apply 
"if a marital deduction from the trust property would 
not be allowed to a spouse who is a trustee and to 
whom a marital deduction would otherwise be al-
lowed under the [IRS] Code." 
81 Estates and Trusts §§ 14- States that, if the trustee of a discretionary trust is un-
401(i),14-403(h)(S) able or unwilling to serve and no successor trustee 
will serve, an adult member of the beneficiary's fami-
ly, which includes a spouse, descendant, stepchild, 
parent, stepparent, grandparent, brother, sister, un-
cle, aunt, whether of whole or half blood or by adop-
tion, may petition the court to designate a successor 
trustee 
82 Estates and Trusts §§ 14- States that, a member of the beneficiary's family, 
401(i),14-40SU)(I)(iv) which includes a spouse, descendant, stepchild, par-
ent, stepparent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, 
aunt, whether of whole or half blood or by adoption, 
"may request an accounting of trust property and 
transactions" from the trustee of a discretionary trust 
83 Estates and Trusts § IS-116 Provides duties of loyalty and fair dealing for trustees 
"regarding the acquisition, retention, and ownership 
of a contract of insurance on the life of the grantor 
of the trust, or on the lives of the grantor and the 
grantor's spouse, children, or grandchildren." 
84 Estates and Trusts § IS- Provides that, a trustee may not make an otherwise 
S02.2(d)(l) lawful adjustment "[t]hat diminishes the income in-
terest in a trust that requires all of the income to be 
paid at least annually to a spouse and for which an es-
tate tax or gift tax marital deduction would be al-
lowed ... if the trustee did not have the power to 
make the adjustment." 
8S Estates and Trusts § IS-S03 States that, in the case of an estate, or after an in-
come interest in a trust ends, in the case of an estate, 
the following rules apply: "A fiduciary shall distribute 
the remaining net income ... to all other benefi-
ciaries . . . but excluding a beneficiary other than a 
surviving spouse who receives a pecuniary amount 
that is not in trust." 
86 Estates and Trusts § IS- Under certain conditions, a "spouse may require the 
S20(a)(l) trustee to make property not productive of income in-
to property productive of income, convert property 
within a reasonable time, or may request the trustee 
exercise the power conferred by § IS.S02.02 of this 
subtitle." 
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87 Estates and Trusts §§ 16- States that, a registering entity is released from all 
101(d),16-108(c) claims to a security by heirs, including the surviving 
spouse of a deceased owner, if it registers the transfer 
of the security in accordance with the Maryland Uni-
form Transfer-on-Death (TOO) Security Registration 
Act and "does so in good faith reliance on the regis-
tration, on this title, and on information provided to 
it" by affidavit of the personal representative of the 
deceased owner, the surviving beneficiary, the surviv-
ing beneficiary's representatives, or by other informa-
tion available to the registering entity 
88 Family Law § 3-102(a) Creates an action for breach of promise to marry for 
a pregnant individual 
89 Family Law § 3-104(b) Allows a holder in due course of a negotiable instru-
ment for payment or settlement of a claim for breach 
of promise to marry or alienation of affections to en-
force the instrument 
90 Family Law § 4-202 Creates a right and sets forth a procedure for a surviv-
ing spouse to bring a personal action to recover the 
rights of the deceased spouse 
91 Family Law § 4-205(d) Allows a depositary who received a deposit from a wo-
man before or during her marriage in fraud of the 
woman's husband's creditors, to attach or restrain the 
payment of the money 
92 Family Law § 4-206(a) States that, whenever any interest or estate of any 
kind of property within the state is in any way trans-
ferred from husband to wife or in any way transferred 
by the couple to another party, the fact of such trans-
actions does not give a present creditor "any other or 
greater right, lien, or cause of action against the in-
terest or estate" than had the property been trans-
ferred by the husband directly to a third person 
93 Family Law § 4-206(b) States that, the fact of a transfer of any kind of an in-
terest or estate from a husband to a wife, or the reci-
tal of it in any instrument of writing, does not consti-
tute notice to any third person of the possibility of, or 
actual, "existence of any present creditor of the hus-
band." 
94 Family Law § 4- States that, an individual is not liable for the debts 
301 (a) (l)(i) contracted by that person's spouse or any claim or de-
mand that arose before the marriage 
95 Family Law § 4-301 (b)-(c) States that, a husband is not liable for the torts or 
contracts of his wife, or for any judgment or decree 
against his wife 
96 Family Law § 4-301 (d) States that, a wife's property acquired before or after 
marriage "is not liable for the payment of her hus-
band's debts." 
97 Family Law § MOl States the General Assembly's policy and "responsibili-
ty to provide services that prevent ... family dissolu-
tion and breakdown that require [ 1 protective services 
or out-of-home placement." 
98 Family Law § M02(b) Establishes a program of services to families with chil-
dren, including, functional services to help a family 
resolve a situational crisis, family and marital counsel-
ing, referral services, and home management services 
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99 Family Law § 4-403(b) Requires that, the Department of Human Resources 
"coordinate for families with children the delivery of 
day care, health, educational, mental health, employ-
ment, housing, and crisis services." 
100 Family Law § 4-602(b) States the General Assembly's intent to provide dis-
placed homemakers, as defined in Family Law § 4-
601, with "counseling, training, employment place-
ment assistance, services, and health care." 
101 Family Law § 4-606(a) Requires that, Multipurpose Service Centers of the 
Department of Human Resources provide: "counsel-
ing; training; skills; services; and education" to assist 
displaced homemakers in obtaining gainful employ-
ment 
102 Family Law § 4-607 Requires that, Multipurpose Service Centers of the 
Department of Human Resources provide job coun-
seling, job training, employment placement, and ser-
vice programs to displaced homemakers 
103 Family Law § 5-202 States that, children of annulled or void marriages re-
main the legitimate children of the parties of the 
marriage 
104 Family Law § 5- Entitles adoptive children to all the rights and privi-
308(b) (1) (ii) (repealed by leges as well as obligations of a child born to the 
the Permanency for Fami- adoptive parent in wedlock 
lies and Children Act of 
2005, 2005 Md. Laws page 
number forthcoming 
Ch464) (to be reenacted 
as Family Law §§ 5-
341 (a) (2) (ii) (adoption 
without prior termination 
of parental rights), 5-
352(a)(2) (ii) (adoption 
with prior termination of 
parental rights), 5-3A-
35(a) (2) (ii) (private adop-
tion), 5-3B-24(a)(2) (ii) (in-
dependent adoption)) 
105 Family Law § 5-315(a) (re- Requires that, a spouse of a petitioner for adoption 
pealed by the Permanency join the adoption petition except in certain circum-
for Families and Children stances 
Act of 2005, 2005 Md. 
Laws 2581) (to be reenact-
ed as Family Law §§ 5-
331 (b) (2) (adoption with-
out prior termination of 
parental rights), 5-
345(b) (2) (adoption with 
prior termination of pa-
rental rights), 5-3A-
29(c) (1) (private adop-
tion), 5-3B-13(b) (2) (inde-
pendent adoption)) 
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106 Family Law § 5-321 (1) (re- Allows an independent adoption by a spouse of the 
pealed by the Permanency natural parent of the adoptee without the require-
for Families and Children ment of advice of counsel, adoption counseling, writ-
Act of 2005, 2005 Md. ten consent, the assessment of attorneys fees and 
Laws 2581) costs, an accounting report, and a medical history of 
the natural paren ts 
107 Family Law § 5-329.1(a) Allows adoptive parents to obtain access to an adop-
(repealed by the Perma- tive child's medical or other health records 
nency for Families and 
Children Act of 2005, 2005 
Md. Laws 2581) (to be re-
enacted as Family Law 
§§ 5-356 (adoption with 
prior termination of pa-
rental rights), 5-3A-39 (pri-
vate adoption)) 
108 Family Law § 5-507 (b) (1) Provides an exception to the rule that a person 
should be licensed by the Social Services Administra-
tion as a child placement agency before that person 
may engage in the placement of minors if the person 
with whom the child is to be placed is "related to the 
child by blood or marriage within 4 degrees of con-
sanguinity or affinity." 
109 Family Law § 5-508 (b) (2) Provides an exception to the rule that a person 
should be licensed by the Social Services Administra-
tion as a child care home before that "person may ex-
ercise care, custody, or control" of minors if the per-
son is "related to the child by blood or marriage with-
in five degrees of consanguinity or affinity." 
110 Family Law § 5-552(b) (1) Allows family day care homes to operate without be-
ing registered "if the day care provider ... is related 
to each child by blood or marriage." 
III Family Law § 5-1027(c) (1) Establishes "a rebuttable presumption that a child is 
the legitimate child of the man to whom its mother 
was married at the time of conception." 
112 Family Law § 5- States that, a father in a paternity action is no longer 
1032(b)(1)(iii) responsible for support to a child upon the child's 
marriage 
113 Family Law § 7-101 (b) Requires that, a spouse seeking a divorce must pre-
sent corroborating testimony 
114 Family Law § 7-102 Provides a married individual with a cause of action 
for limited divorce 
115 Family Law § 7-103 Provides a married individual with a cause of action 
for absolute divorce 
116 Family Law § 7-103.2(b) Allows a court to order a married couple, seeking a 
divorce, to participate in an educational seminar prior 
to granting a divorce decree 
117 Family Law § 7-107(a), (b) Allows a court to order a party to pay reasonable ex-
penses, including: "suit money; counsel fees; and 
costs," to a party for prosecuting or defending an ac-
tion for divorce 
118 Family Law § 8-101 Allows a married couple to create enforceable private 
agreements regarding "alimony, support, property 
rights, or personal rights." 
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119 Family Law § 8-103(a) Allows a court to modify the private agreement be-
tween spouses to reflect the best interest of the child 
120 Family Law § 8-201 (e) Defines marital property as any property acquired by 
one or both parties during the marriage, any real 
property titled as tenants by the entireties, and ex-
cludes property obtained before the marriage, ac-
quired by inheritance or gift, excluded by agreement, 
or directly traceable to any of the forgoing 
121 Family Law § 8-203(a) Allows a court to determine marital property in a pro-
ceeding for an annulment or absolute divorce 
122 Family Law § 8-204(a) Allows a court to determine the value of all marital 
property in a proceeding for an annulment or abso-
lute divorce 
123 Family Law § 8-205(a) Allows a court to grant a monetary award or transfer 
ownership in a retirement account in a proceeding 
for an annulment or absolute divorce 
124 Family Law § 8-207(a) Allows a court to determine which property is the 
family home and family use personal property before 
or when granting an annulment or a limited or abso-
lute divorce 
125 Family Law §§ 8-208, 8-209 Allows a court to award the possession and use of the 
family home or family use property as well as allocate 
financial responsibilities of that property in granting 
an annulment or absolute divorce; allows a court to 
set terms and conditions on and modify an award of 
possession and use of the family home or family use 
property 
126 Family Law § 8-210 States the circumstances requiring the termination of 
an order for the possession and use of the family 
home or family use property 
127 Family Law § 8-212 Allows a Maryland court to exercise its powers with re-
spect to the use and possession of the family home 
and family use property in an annulment or absolute 
divorce granted in a foreign jurisdiction 
128 Family Law § 8-214(a), (b) Allows a court to order a party to pay reasonable ex-
penses, including: "suit money; counsel fees; and 
costs," to a party for prosecuting or defending an ac-
tion for division of marital property 
129 Family Law § 9-101.1 (b) (2) Allows a court to consider abuse of a spouse in mak-
ing determinations in a custody or visitation proceed-
ing 
130 Family Law § 9-104 Provides a noncustodial parent with "access to medi-
cal, dental, and educational records concerning the 
child." 
131 Family Law § 9-105 Provides a court with several remedies for a party who 
can show that another "party to a custody or visitation 
order has unjustifiably denied or interfered ",;th visi-
tation granted by a custody or visitation order." 
132 Family Law § 9-106 Allows a court to require a party to a custody or visita-
tion order to give 45 days notice to the other party of 
their intention to relocate the permanent residence 
of the child 
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133 Family Law § 9-302(a) (1) Provides a Maryland equity court with 'Jurisdiction 
over custody and visitation of a child who is removed 
from [Maryland] by a parent of the child, if ... the 
parents are separated or divorced" and Maryland was 
either "the marital domicile ... or the domicile in 
which the marriage contract was last performed." 
134 Family Law § 9.5-310(d) Precludes the invocation of the spousal communica-
tion privilege or a defense of immunity based on the 
husband and wife relationship 
135 Family Law § 10-103 States that, the State's Attorney, the Child Support 
Enforcement Administration of the Department of 
Human Resources, or a local support enforcement of-
fice may "use any civil or criminal remedy to enforce 
a child or spousal support order." 
136 Family Law § 10-121 (a) Allows a court to impose an earnings withholding no-
tice pursuant to a child or spousal support order 
137 Family Law § 10- Establishes an element in a motion for a support or-
134(a) (3) (ii) der obligor to terminate a withholding order that the 
arrearage of support that gave rise to the withholding 
order was inter alia the result of the death of the obli-
gor's spouse 
138 Family Law § 10-201(a), Provides a criminal offense and penalty for willful fail-
(b) ure to provide for the support of a spouse without 
just cause 
139 Family Law § 10-202(a) Allows a court to impose an order to pay spousal sup-
port upon the conviction of a party for willful failure 
to pay spousal support or by consent of the accused 
party 
140 Family Law § 10-207(a) Allows a court to order the Commissioner of Correc-
tion to deduct an amount of an inmate's earnings in 
order to pay the inmate's spousal support order 
141 Family Law § 10-328(g), Precludes the invocation of both the spousal commu-
(h) nication and testimonial privilege so that a spouse 
may be compelled to testifY against the other in any 
proceeding under the Maryland Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act 
142 Family Law § 10-332(a) Allows a court to issue a support order, including 
spousal support, for an individual or support enforce-
ment agency from another state 
143 Family Law § 1 0-338 (a) Provides a means for a support order obligor to "con-
test the validity or enforcement of an income with-
holding order issued in another state and received di-
rectly by an employer in [Maryland]." 
144 Family Law §§ 11-101, 11- Allows a court to award definite and indefinite alimo-
106 ny as part of a decree of divorce or annulment 
145 Family Law § 11-102(a) Allows a court to award alimony pendente lite as part of 
a proceeding for a divorce or annulment 
146 Family Law § 11-104(a) Allows a court to award alimony pendente lite as part of 
a proceeding for a divorce against a nonresident de-
fendant 
147 Family Law § 11-105 Allows a Maryland court to award alimony to either 
party of a divorce or annulment granted by a court of 
another jurisdiction 
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148 Family Law § 11-107 Allows a court to extend an alimony award period 
and modifY the amount awarded 
149 Family Law § 11-108(2) States that, alimony terminates upon the remarriage 
of the recipient 
150 Family Law § 11-110(a), Allows a court to order a party to pay reasonable ex-
(b) penses, including "suit money; counsel fees; and 
costs," to a party for prosecuting or defending an ac-
tion for alimony 
151 Family Law § 11-111 (a) Allows a court to allocate "additional costs of provid-
ing hospital, medical, or surgical benefits" between 
the parties to a divorce either pendente lite or after the 
divorce is granted 
152 Family Law § 11-112 Allows a court to order a party to pay alimony, pay a 
lump sum, or give bond to the state to provide for 
the support one party found "permanently and incur-
ably insane." 
153 Family Law § 12-101(a) Allows a court to award child support, both pendente 
lite and for a fixed period 
154 Family Law § 12-101(d) Allows a court to order a party to pay a portion or all 
of "the mother's medical and hospital expenses for 
pregnancy, confinement, and recovery and ... medi-
cal support for the child, including neonatal ex-
penses." 
155 Family Law § 12-102(b) Allows a court to order a parent to include a child in 
their health insurance coverage as part of any support 
order 
156 Family Law § 12-103(a) Allows a court to order a party to pay costs and coun-
sel fees in any case involving the application, recov-
ery, or enforcement of any custody, support, or visita-
tion proceeding 
157 Financial Institutions § 6- Allows a spouse of an individual who is eligible for 
302(b) (5) membership in a credit union to be a member 
158 Financial Institutions § 8- With regards to Savings and Loan Associations, the 
307(d) spouse of the Division Director or any Division staff 
"may not become indebted to any association or relat-
ed entity that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Divi-
sion Director." 
159 Financial Institutions § 11- Exempts the extension of credit or granting of a loan 
301 (a) (1) between relatives from the licensing provision re-
quired for installment loans 
160 Financial Institutions § 11- Allows the Commissioner of Financial Regulation in 
405 the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation 
to deny the application for a license to deal as a sales 
finance company if the spouse of the applicant has, 
inter alia, had a license revoked 
161 Financial Institutions § 11- Exempts a person "making a mortgage loan to a bor-
502(b)(8) rower who is that person's spouse ... child's spouse 
... or grandchild's spouse" from the licensing re-
quirement for mortgage lenders 
162 Health General § 4- States that, the Department of Health and Mental Hy-
215(e)(5) (iii) giene may not deny inspection of a burial permit re-
cord to the spouse of the deceased "whose human re-
mains have been disinterred or reinterred." 
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163 Health General § 4-217(e) Requires the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene 
to include "a notice which advises that certain individ· 
uals may be entitled to continuation of group health 
insurance benefits" with every copy of a death certifi· 
cate 
164 Health General § 5· Allows a spouse to grant consent for a postmortem 
501 (b)(l) (ii) examination of a body by a physician if the spouse 
has assumed control of the body for its final disposi-
tion 
165 Health General § 5- States that, the surviving spouse of a deceased individ· 
509(c)(1) ual has first priority to "the right to arrange for the fi· 
nal disposition of the body of the decedent" if the de· 
cedent had not executed a document that expresses 
the decedent's wishes concerning the disposition of 
their body 
166 Health General § 5· Prohibits a spouse of an owner, operator, or employ· 
602(b)(1), (3) ee of a health care facility from which the declarant 
of an advance directive is receiving health care from 
serving as a health care agent 
167 Health General § 5- Allows a patient's spouse "to make decisions about 
605(a) (2) health care for a person who has been certified to be 
incapable of making an informed decision and who 
has not appointed a health care agent." 
168 Health General § 7·1003(f) Provides that, "[i]f it is feasible to do so and not med· 
ically contraindicated, spouses who are both residents 
of a licensed residential facility [for developmental 
disabilities] shall be given the opportunity to share a 
room." 
169 Health General § 7- Provides that, "[e]ach married individual in a licensed 
1003(i) (2) residential facility [for developmental disabilities] 
shall have privacy during a visit by the spouse." 
170 Health General § 10- Prohibits a certificate for involuntary admission to a 
616(c) (2) state mental health facility to be used "if the physician 
or psychologist who signed the certificate ... [i]s re-
lated, by ... marriage, to the individual or to the ap-
plicant." 
171 Health General § 10- Prohibits an individual from being transported be-
807(e) (2) tween mental health facilities without the individual's 
spouse 
172 Health General § 13- Prohibits a voting member of the State Advisory 
104(a) (2) (iv) Council on Hereditary and Congenital Disorders ap-
pointed by the Governor from being a "spouse of a 
health professional ... or spouse of an individual in-
volved in the administration or ownership of any 
health care institution or health insurance organiza-
tion." 
173 Health General § 15- States that, "[t]he spouse of a [Maryland Medical and 
122(a) Pharmacy Assistance] Program recipient is responsible 
for payments for the health care needs of the Pro-
gram recipient to the extent that the spouse is able to 
pay." 
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174 Health General §§ 15- States that, an individual is eligible for the Maryland 
201 (c)(ii), 15-202(c) AIDS Insurance Assistance Program if, inter alia, the 
individual's family, which includes the applicant/re. 
cipient's spouse, "cash assets do not exceed $lO,OOO," 
and "[tlhe individual's family income does not ex-
ceed 300 percent of the federal poverty level." 
175 Health General §§ 16- Exempts from the cost of care of a recipient of ser-
101(0, 16-203(a) (4) vices in a facility or program that is operated or fund-
ed by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
who is a responsible relative, which includes a spouse 
of a recipient, if the spouse "has been the victim of 
sexual abuse, physical abuse, or a crime of violence 
... perpetrated by the recipient of services." 
176 Health General §§ 16- States that, if a responsible relative, which includes 
101(0, 16-204(d)(4) the spouse of a recipient of services, "who is liable for 
the cost of care of the recipient of services" has sub-
mitted fraudulent information or misrepresented as-
sets, thus avoiding any part of the claim for the cost 
of care, "there is no limitation on the time in which 
the claim may be brought against the estate." 
177 Health General §§ 16- States that, the liability of a responsible relative, which 
101(0, 16-404(c) includes the spouse of a recipient of services, "for the 
cost of care of a mentally retarded individual in a res-
idential, state facility" ends when the cost of care has 
been charged for a period or periods that total 16 
years 
178 Health General § 19-310 For the purposes of organ donation, a spouse has first 
priority to consent as the deceased's representative to 
any donation 
179 Health General § 19- Spouses who are both admitted to a hospital or relat-
344(h), (k) ed institution "shall be given the opportunity to share 
a room," if it is feasible and medically appropriate. 
Further, "each married resident of a facility shall have 
privacy during a visit by the spouse." 
180 Health General § 20-102 States that, minors have "the same capacity as an 
adult to consent to medical treatment" if the minor is 
married or is a parent. Further, "without the consent 
of or over the express objection of a minor," physi-
cians and others may "give a parent, guardian, or cus-
todian of the minor or the spouse of the parent infor-
mation about treatment needed by the minor." 
181 Health General § 20-104 "Without the consent of or over the express objection 
of a minor," various physicians and others may "give a 
parent, guardian, or custodian of the minor or the 
spouse of the parent information about treatment of 
a mental disorder needed by the minor." 
182 Health General § 20-105 For the purposes of informal kinship care, "relative," 
as it relates to a minor's consent, is defined as "an 
adult related to the child by blood or marriage within 
the fifth degree of consanguinity." 
183 Health Occupations §§ 1- Prohibits a health care practitioner from referring a 
301(j)(I),1-302(a) patient to a health care entity in which the health 
care practitioner's spouse owns a beneficial interest 
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184 Health Occupations §§ 1- Requires a health care practitioner making a lawful 
3010)(1),1-303(a)-(b) referral to "disclose the existence of the beneficial in-
terest" of a spouse in the health care entity to which 
the referral is being made 
185 Health Occupations §§ 7- Requires the Maryland State Board of Morticians to 
101 (s), 7-308(a) "issue a surviving spouse license to an applicant if the 
applicant ... fils the surviving spouse of a licensed 
mortician or licensed funeral director whose license 
was in good standing at the time of death and who 
was operating and wholly or partly owned a mortuary 
science business" at the time of death 
186 Health Occupations §§ 7- Requires that, "[a] personal representative who wishes 
101(s), 7-308.1 to continue operation of a mortuary science business 
upon expiration of the executor license must be ... 
the holder of a surviving spouse license." 
187 Health Occupations §§ 7- Requires the Maryland State Board of Morticians to 
101 (s), 7-310(c) (2) "issue a funeral establishment license to a funeral es-
tablishment that . . . [w] ill be owned and operated by 
... a holder of a surviving spouse ... license." 
188 Health Occupations §§ 7- Allows a holder of a surviving spouse license "to offer 
101(s),7-405(b)(l) or agree ... to provide services or merchandise 
under a pre-need contract." 
189 Health Occupations §§ 7- Requires a licensed funeral director to "provide to the 
101(s),7-407(a) surviving spouse ... of the deceased or authorized 
representative a notice which advises that certain indi-
viduals may be entitled to continuation of group 
health insurance benefits." 
190 Health Occupations §§ 7- States that the surviving spouse of a deceased individ-
101 (s), 7-410(c) ual has first priority to "the right to arrange for the fi-
nal disposition of the body of the decedent" if the de-
cedent had not executed a document that expresses 
the decedent's wishes concerning the disposition of 
his or her body 
191 Insurance § 8-606 (a) , (d) Requires that, "[b]efore an offer to purchase a policy 
can be made to the viator, a viatical settlement pro-
vider shall provide the viator with a disclosure state-
ment" containing specified language notifYing the via-
tor of the requirement to disclose the identity of the 
insured's spouse 
192 Insurance § 10-120(a) Allows the Maryland Insurance Commissioner to "is-
sue a temporary license to act as an insurance pro-
ducer" to a surviving spouse of a deceased or a 
spouse of a mentally or physically disabled insurance 
producer 
193 Insurance § 12-202 (b) (1) Allows a spouse to put into effect a life or health in-
surance policy on the other spouse 
194 Insurance § 14-115(e)(9) Prohibits a member of the board of directors of a 
nonprofit health services plan from being another 
member's spouse, child's spouse, spouse's parent, or 
sibling's spouse 
195 Insurance § 15-201 (c) (2) Allows a health insurance policy to insure a policy-
holder's spouse upon application of an adult member 
of a family 
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196 Insurance § 15-215 Allows an insurer to include in a policy an optional 
provision permitting an indemnity for loss of life pay-
able to an estate or beneficiary under 18 years of age 
which may be paid to any relative by blood or con-
nection by marriage 
197 Insurance § 15-404(b) Allows the coverage on a group or blanket health in-
surance policy of a subscriber's dependent children at 
any time and without evidence of insurability if the 
children were covered under the policy of the sub-
scriber's deceased spouse 
198 Insurance § 15-407(b) (2) Requires a group contract insurance provider to pro-
vide continuation coverage for a qualified secondary 
beneficiary, which includes the spouse of the insured, 
after the insured's death 
199 Insurance § 15-408(b) (2) Requires a group contract insurance provider to pro-
vide continuation coverage for a qualified secondary 
beneficiary, which includes the spouse of the insured, 
after the divorce of the insured and the beneficiary 
spouse 
200 Insurance § 15-409(d)(5) Requires a group contract insurance provider to pro-
vide continuation coverage for the spouse of the in-
sured if the group contract provides benefits for 
spouses and the insured's spouse was covered on the 
group contract before the insured was involuntarily 
terminated 
201 Insurance § 15-411 (a) Requires a group contract insurance provider to pro-
vide continuous open enrollment to allow "a married 
employee who is enrolled ... to alter the terms of 
the employee's coverage to include the employee's 
spouse ... if the employee's spouse loses coverage 
under another group health insurance contract ... 
because of the involuntary termination of the spouse's 
employment." 
202 Insurance § 15-414(b) Requires a group contract insurance provider to "pro-
vide the same conversion rights and conditions to a 
covered dependent spouse of an employee ... that 
are provided to the covered employee ... if the de-
pendent spouse ceases to be a qualified familymem-
ber because of divorce or the death of the employee." 
203 Insurance § 15-810(b) An insurer or nonprofit health service plan that pro-
vides pregnancy-related benefits "may not exclude 
benefits for all outpatient expenses arising from in vi-
tro fertilization procedures performed on the ... de-
pendent spouse of a policyholder or subscriber." 
204 Insurance § 15-1206(c) (3) States that, employees who have group spousal cover-
age may not be eligible for certain other forms of in-
surance 
205 Insurance § 15-1208(b) States that, a late enrollee in a health services plan 
will not be subject to a waiting period for preexisting 
conditions if "a court has ordered coverage to be pro-
vided for a spouse," or "a request for enrollment is 
made within 30 days after the eligible employee's 
marriage." 
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206 Insurance § 15-1208.1 (c) Requires small employer health benefit plans to offer 
a special enrollment period such that "an individual 
who becomes a dependent of the eligible employee 
through marriage, ... an eligible employee who ac-
quires a new dependent through marriage, ... [or] 
the spouse of an eligible employee at the birth or 
adoption of a child" can be enrolled under the health 
benefit plan 
207 Insurance § 15-1406.1 (c) Requires a group health benefit plan that makes cov-
erage available to dependents of an eligible employee 
to offer a special enrollment period such that "an in-
dividual who becomes a dependent of the eligible em-
ployee through marriage, ... an eligible employee 
who acquires a new dependent through marriage, ... 
[or] the spouse of an eligible employee at the birth 
or adoption of a child" can be enrolled under the 
group health benefit plan 
208 Insurance § 16-110(a) Allows an insurer to pay the life insurance proceeds 
of a resident of the state who dies intestate with an es-
tate not exceeding $1,000 to the decedent's surviving 
spouse without the grant of letters of administration 
under certain circumstances 
209 Insurance § 16-111 (a) Exempts from creditors the proceeds of a policy of 
life insurance made for the benefit of or assigned to 
the spouse of an individual 
210 Insurance § 16- Allows for a clause to be included on a policy of life 
212(b) (1)(ii) insurance that allows the insurer to "make a payment 
under the policy ... to any relative of the insured by 
... connection by marriage." 
211 Insurance § 16-305 (c) Sets the cash surrender value of family life insurance 
policies that "define [ ] a primary insured and pro-
vide [ ] term insurance on the life of the spouse of the 
primary insured that expires before the spouse's age 
71." 
212 Insurance § 17-209(a), (c) Allows group life insurance policies to "be extended 
to cover the spouse ... of each insured employee" 
and to provide rights of conversion to an insured 
spouse if the policy terminates or is amended to ter-
minate the spouse's coverage 
213 Insurance § 20-519 Provides that, the suspension or revocation of a Mary-
land Automobile Insurance Fund policyholder's li-
cense cannot result in the cancellation of the cover-
age of a spouse included on the policy 
214 Insurance § 20- Prohibits an uninsured driver's spouse who lives in 
601(e)(l) (iii) the uninsured driver's household from submitting a 
claim against the Maryland Automobile Insurance 
Fund 
215 Labor and Employment Excludes a spouse of an employer from the require-
§ 3-403 (a) (7) ment of minimum wage 
216 Labor and Employment Excludes employment for a spouse from covered em-
§ 8-215(1) ployment with regard to unemployment insurance 
benefits 
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217 Labor and Employment Excludes employment at an educational institution by 
§ 8-220(b) a spouse of a student enrolled and regularly attend-
ing classes at that institution from covered employ-
ment with regard to unemployment insurance bene-
fits 
218 Labor and Employment States that, alimony and spousal support can only be 
§ 8-808.1 withheld from unemployment insurance to the extent 
provided under federal law 
219 Labor and Employment Requires disqualification of an individual from receiv-
§ 8-1001 (d)(2) ing unemployment benefits "if an individual leaves 
employment ... to accompany ... or to join a 
spouse in a new location." 
220 Labor and Employment Allows a surviving spouse of a covered employee 
§ 9-509(d) killed as a result of the deliberate intent of the em· 
ployer to bring a claim for worker's compensation 
221 Labor and Employment Provides a surviving spouse of a covered employee 
§ 9-632(d)(l) with a permanent partial disability who died with a Ie· 
gal obligation to support that spouse with the right to 
the unpaid worker's compensation due the employee 
222 Labor and Employment Provides a surviving spouse of a covered employee 
§ 9-640(d)(l) with a permanent total disability who died with a legal 
obligation to support that spouse with the right to the 
unpaid worker's compensation due the employee 
223 Labor and Employment Provides a surviving spouse of a covered employee 
§ 9-646(d)(l) with a hernia who died with a legal obligation to sup-
port that spouse with the right to the unpaid worker's 
compensation due the employee 
224 Labor and Employment Precludes a surviving spouse of a covered employee 
§ 9-680(a) whose death was caused by an accidental personal in-
jury or an occupational disease from receiving work-
er's compensation benefits if "the surviving spouse 
deserts the covered employee for more than 1 year 
before the time of the occurrence" of the accident or 
disablement 
225 Labor and Employment Requires an employer to continue to pay weekly 
§ 9-681 (d) death benefits to a wholly dependent surviving spouse 
who remains wholly dependent after $45,000 is paid, 
for as long as the surviving spouse is totally depen-
dent 
226 Labor and Employment Requires an employer to continue to pay weekly 
§§ 9-681 (e), 9-682(a) death benefits to a wholly dependent surviving spouse 
who becomes wholly self·supporting before the em· 
ployer pays $45,000 until $45,000 is paid, and re-
quires an employer to pay weekly death benefits to a 
partially self-supporting surviving spouse for the peri-
od of partial dependency or until $60,000 has been 
paid 
227 Labor and Employment Requires an employer to discontinue payment of 
§ 9-681 (f) weekly death benefits to a wholly dependent surviving 
spouse who remarries before $45,000 is paid unless 
the surviving spouse does not have dependent chil-
dren 
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228 Labor and Employment Requires an employer to continue payment of weekly 
§ 9·682(d) death benefits to a partially dependent surviving 
spouse who remarries, does not have dependent chil-
dren, and who had not received more than $60,000 
before the remarriage 
229 Natural Resources § 4- Exempts a spouse of the owner or tenant of land bor-
604(d)(l) dering non tidal water or "the spouse of any child who 
resides on the land with the owner or tenant when he 
fishes in non tidal water adjoining his land" from the 
requirement of an angler's license 
230 Natural Resources § 4- Allows a tidal fishing license holder to transfer the Ii-
701 (i)(2) cense to a spouse subject to the approval of the De-
partment of Natural Resources 
231 Natural Resources § 10- Exempts a spouse of the owner of farmland, tenant's 
301(b) spouse, and the owner's and tenant's children's 
spouse residing on the property from the require-
ment of a hunting license for farmland hunting only 
232 Public Safety § 1-202(b) (a) Provides a death benefit of $50,000 to be paid to the 
surviving spouse of several kinds of public safety of-
ficers who are killed or die in the performance of 
their duties 
233 Public Safety § 1-202(d) Prov;des a funeral benefit of $10,000 to be paid to 
the surviving spouse of several kinds of public safety 
officers who are killed or die in the perfonnance of 
their duties 
234 Public Safety § 5-136(a) (2) Requires a spouse receiving a regulated firearm as a 
gift from the purchasing spouse to "complete an ap-
plication to purchase or transfer a regulated firearm; 
and forward the application to the Secretary" of State 
Police 
235 Public Safety § 7-203 Requires the Board of Trustees of the Maryland State 
Firemen's Association to pay a death benefit to a de-
cedent member of a volunteer fire company or volun-
teer rescue squad's surviving spouse in certain circum-
stances 
236 Public Safety §§ 7- Provides that, a surviving spouse benefit is discontin-
203(c) (l)(i), 7-209 (c) (3) ued when the survivor remarnes 
237 Public Safety § 14-212(a) Precludes an action for eviction or distress from being 
"brought against a person in emergency management 
service or person suffering injury or damage if ... 
the premises are occupied for dwelling purposes by 
the spouse ... of the person in emergency manage-
ment service or person suffering injury or damage." 
238 Public Utility Companies Prohibits the spouse of each commissioner, the Peo-
§ 2-303(a)-(b) pie's Counsel, the General Counsel, a hearing exam-
iner, and each officer or employee of the Public Ser-
vice Commission or Office of People's Counsel from 
holding "an official relation to or connection with a 
public service company" or having "a pecuniary inter-
est in a public service company." 
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239 Public Utility Companies Prohibits the spouse of each commissioner, the Peo-
§ 2-307(a)-(b) pie's Counsel, the General Counsel, a hearing exam-
iner, and each officer or employee of the Public Ser-
vice Commission or Office of People's Counsel from 
accepting "a gift, gratuity, or special consideration" 
from a public service company or its officer, agent, or 
employee 
240 Public Utility Companies Prohibits "[aJ public service company or its officer, 
§ 2-308(b)(l) agent, or employee" from offering "a gift, gratuity, or 
special consideration" to the spouse of each commis-
sioner, the People's Counsel, the General Counsel, a 
hearing examiner, and each officer or employee of 
the Public Service Commission or Office of People's 
Counsel 
241 Real Property § 4-108 (b) Allows a husband and wife holding property as te-
nants by the entirety to avoid straw deeds by acting 
jointly or individually to transfer to property interest 
to another type of estate 
242 Real Property §§ 7-301 Ul Provides certain protections for a residence in foreclo-
to 7-321 sure, defined as a residential real property consisting 
of less than five single family dwelling units, "one of 
which is occupied by the owner, or the owner's 
spouse or former spouse under a use and possession 
order issued under ... the Family Law Article, as the 
individual's principal place of residence, and against 
which an order to docket or a petition to foreclose 
has been filed." 
243 Real Property § 8-326 Subjects all goods on a leased premises naming hus-
band or wife as tenant "to levy under distress to the 
same extent as if both were named in the lease as te-
nants." 
244 Real Property § 11- Limits a local government's right to purchase a rental 
138(d) (7) facility transferred to a spouse 
245 Real Property § 14-121(b), Allows a spouse to request the owner of a burial site 
(d) to grant reasonable access to the burial site for the 
purposes of restoring, maintaining, viewing, or trans-
porting human remains for interment to a burial site 
246 State Finance and Procure- Includes any interests held by an individual's spouse 
ment § 13-221 (b)(2), as interests held by that individual for purposes of dis-
(c)(I) closures to the Secretary of State regarding informa-
tion about businesses contracting with the State for 
$100,000 or more 
247 State Finance and Procure- States that, "[iJf, during the performance of a con-
ment §§ 14-301 (g), 14- tract, a certified minority business enterprise contrac-
302(a)(7) tor or subcontractor becomes ineligible to participate 
in the Minority Business Enterprise Program because 
one or more of its owners has a personal net worth," 
which includes in an individual's personal net worth 
any share of assets held jointly or as community prop-
erty with the individual's spouse, that exceeds 
$750,000, "that ineligibility alone may not cause the 
termination of the certified minority business enter-
prise's contractual relationship for the remainder of 
the term of the contract; and the certified minority 
business enterprise's participation under the contract 
shall continue to be counted toward the program and 
contract goals." 
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248 State Government § 2- Prohibits a member of the General Assembly from 
107(b) (1) employing a member's spouse or a spouse of a anoth-
er member from the same legislative district for legis-
lative business "using public funds over which the 
member has direct contro!." 
249 State Government § 9- Prohibits a spouse of an officer or employee of the 
123(2) State Lottery Agency who resides in the principal resi-
dence of the officer or employee from buying a state 
lottery ticket or receiving a prize 
250 State Government §§ 15- States that, a disqualification of a member of the Gen-
102(s), 15-512(a) (l )(i) (2) eral Assembly from participating in any legislative ac-
tion because of a conflict with the public interest can-
not be suspended if the conflict is direct and personal 
to a member of the legislator's immediate family, 
which includes a spouse 
251 State Government §§ 15- Requires a legislator to report in writing to the Joint 
102(s), 15-513(b)(3) Ethics Committee "the name of any business enter-
prise subject to regulation by a State agency in which 
the legislator and ... spouse ... together or sepa-
rately" have a certain amount of financial interest 
252 State Government §§ 15- Exempts a member of the General Assembly from fil-
102(s), 15-607(e)(l) ing a financial disclosure statement regarding any gift 
received from the member's spouse 
253 State Government §§ 15- Requires a regulated lobbyist to "file with the Ethics 
102(s), 15-704(b)(2)(vi) Commission, under oath and for each registration, a 
separate report concerning the regulated lobbyist's 
lobbying activities" including "total expenditures in 
connection with influencing executive action or legis-
lative action" such as meals and beverages for mem-
bers of the immediate families, including spouses, of 
officials or employees 
254 State Government §§ 15- Requires a regulated lobbyist to file a separate report 
102(s), 15-705(a) disclosing the name of a member of the lobbyist's im-
mediate family, including a spouse, "of a State official 
of the Executive Branch who has benefitted during 
the reporting period from gifts of meals or beverages 
from the regulated lobbyist, whether or not in con-
nection with lobbying activities." 
255 State Government §§ 15- Exempts a regulated lobbyist from disclosing gifts to 
102(s), 15-710 the regulated lobbyist'S immediate family, including a 
spouse, "if the gift is: purely personal and private in 
nature and not related to the regulated lobbyist'S lob-
bying activities; and from the regulated lobbyist's per-
sonal funds and not attributable to any other entity or 
entities." 
256 State Government § 15- Exempts an official or employee of State government 
505(c) (2) (x) (1) from the general prohibition on solicitation or accept-
ance of gifts if the "gift is from ... an individual re-
lated to the official or employee by blood or mar-
riage." 
257 State Government § 15- Includes an interest held by a spouse of an individual 
608(a) (1) to be reported as an interest of that individual in 
§ 15-607 
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258 State Government § 15- Requires a spouse who has made contributions to the 
849(a)(2)(i) treasurer of a candidate or a political committee "hav-
ing a cumulative value of $500 or more during the 
48-month period before the application was filed or 
during the pendency of the application," to file a dis-
closure providing certain information 
259 State Government § 19- Allows a spouse of a person serving in the armed 
111(a) forces of the United States to acknowledge an instru-
ment 
260 State Personnel and Pen- Prohibits a state employee from directly supervising 
sions § 2-307(a) the employee's spouse 
261 State Personnel and Pen- Allows a "surviving spouse of a State employee who 
sions § 2-507(b) died while employed by the State" to enroll and par-
ticipate in the State Employee and Retiree Health 
and Welfare Benefits Program 
262 State Personnel and Pen- Allows a surviving spouse of a deceased retiree to en-
sions § 2-508(b)(2) roll and participate in the State Employee and Retiree 
Health and Welfare Benefits Program 
263 State Personnel and Pen- Allows a surviving spouse of a State employee with op-
sions § 2-509 (a) (3) tional retirement to enroll and participate in the 
State Employee and Retiree Health and Welfare Bene-
fits Program 
264 State Personnel and Pen- Allows a surviving spouse of an employee or former 
sions § 2-511 (b), (c) employee of the Maryland Environmental Service and 
Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authority to en-
roll and participate in the State Employee and Retiree 
Health and Welfare Benefits Program 
265 State Personnel and Pen- Provides a special enrollment period in the State Em-
sions § 2-514(a) ployee and Retiree Health and Welfare Benefits Pro-
gram "for a nonparticipating State employee after the 
death of a spouse who was not a State employee." 
266 State Personnel and Pen- Provides "the spouse of an eligible veteran who has a 
sions § 7-207(c)(2) service connected disability; or ... the surviving 
spouse of a deceased eligible veteran" with ten points 
on any selection test for an appointment in skilled or 
professional se,,~ce 
267 State Personnel and Pen- States that, "[aln employee may voluntarily donate 
sions § 9-604 unused annual, sick, or personal leave to another em-
ployee who has exhausted all available annual, per-
sonal, sick, and compensatory leave because of a seri-
ous and prolonged medical condition of the employ-
ee or a catastrophic illness or injury of a member of 
the employee's immediate family." 
268 State Personnel and Pen- Provides a death benefit of $100,000 to the surviving 
sions § 10-404(c) (1) (i) spouse of certain state employees 
269 State Personnel and Pen- Provides a death benefit of $50,000 to the surviving 
sions § 10-404(c)(2) (i) spouse of certain state employees 
270 State Personnel and Pen- Allows a member of the Law Enforcement Officers 
sions § 21-401 (a)(2) Pension System, State Police Retirement System, or 
Judges' Retirement System to elect a reduced allow-
ance to be paid instead of the basic allowance provid-
ed by the system only if the member is not married at 
the time of retirement 
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271 State Personnel and Pen- Requires the Board of Trustees to offer counseling re-
sions § 21-503(2) garding retirement benefits to an immediate family 
member if a member, former member or retiree in 
the State Retirement and Pension System consents 
272 State Personnel and Pen- Allows a surviving spouse of a member, former mem-
sions § 21-602(b) ber, or retiree in the State Retirement and Pension 
System to "elect to have all or any part of the eligible 
rollover distribution to be paid in a direct rollover to 
an individual retirement account." 
273 State Personnel and Pen- Allows "[t)he surviving spouse of a member of the 
sions § 22-305(a)(4) Teachers' Retirement System [to) pay for the appro-
priate final adjustment" in certain circumstances 
274 State Personnel and Pen- Allows the surviving spouse of a retired Governor or a 
sions § 22-405(e), (f) Governor who died while in office to receive one-half 
of the Governor's retirement allowance 
275 State Personnel and Pen- Allows the surviving spouse of a member of the 
sions § 23-308(e) Teachers' Pension System who was making alternative 
methods of payment for service credit to pay for the 
appropriate final adjustment in certain circumstances 
276 State Personnel and Pen- States that, a surviving spouse is a deSignated benefici-
sions § 24-401.1 (i)(2)(i) ary of a member of the Deferred Retirement Option 
Program in the State Police Retirement System 
277 State Personnel and Pen- Requires the Board of Trustees of the State Police Re-
sions § 24-403(b)(l) tirement System to pay 50% of a deceased retiree's re-
tirement allowance to a surviving spouse 
278 State Personnel and Pen- Requires the Board of Trustees of the State Police Re-
sions § 24-404(a)(2)(i), tirement System to pay of a deceased retiree's special 
(3) (i) disability retirement allowance, service retirement al-
lowance, or ordinary disability retirement allowance to 
a surviving spouse 
279 State Personnel and Pen- States that, a surviving spouse is a designated benefici-
sions § 26-401.1 (i)(2)(i) ary of a member of the Deferred Retirement Option 
Program in the Law Enforcement Officers' Pension 
System 
280 State Personnel and Pen- Requires the Board of Trustees of the Law Enforce-
sions § 26-402 (b) (1) ment Officers' Pension System to pay 50% of a de-
ceased retiree's retirement allowance to a surviving 
spouse 
281 State Personnel and Pen- States that, Title 27, outlining the Judges' Retirement 
sions § 27-103 System, "does not impair or reduce any benefit that a 
... spouse of a member, former member, or retiree 
has been or would be entitled to receive under any 
public general law." 
282 State Personnel and Pen- Requires the Board of Trustees of the Judges' Retire-
sions § 27-403(a), (b) ment System to pay 50% of the retirement allowance 
of a member, former member, or retiree to the sur-
viving spouse 
283 State Personnel and Pen- States that, the "payment of an allowance ends and 
sions § 27-404 further rights may not arise from service as a member 
[of the Judges' Retirement System)" if the member 
does not leave a surviving spouse or the surviving 
spouse dies and there are no children of the member 
under 18 years of age 
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284 State Personnel and Pen- Prohibits a county from paying a supplement to a sur-
sions § 27-407(b) viving spouse of a member, former member, or re-
tiree of the Judges' Retirement System 
285 State Personnel and Pen- Requires the Board of Trustees of the Law Enforce-
sions § 29-203(a) (2) (i) (1) ment Officers' Pension System to pay 50% of the or-
dinary disability retirement allowance of a member to 
the surviving spouse in certain circumstances 
286 State Personnel and Pen- Requires the Board of Trustees of the State Police Re-
sions § 29-204(a) (2) tirement System to pay the accumulated contributions 
to the designated beneficiary and 50% of the average 
final compensation of a member to the surviving 
spouse in certain circumstances 
287 State Personnel and Pen- Allows a surviving spouse of a member of the Correc-
sions § 29-205 tional Officers' Retirement System, Employees' Retire-
ment System, Local Fire and Police System, or Teach-
ers' Retirement System to elect to receive the death 
benefit or an allowance equal to the amount payable 
under Option 2 of the optional allowances under cer-
tain circumstances 
288 State Personnel and Pen- Allows a surviving spouse of a member of the Employ-
sions § 29-206 ee's Pension System, Teachers' Pension System, or the 
Local Fire and Police System to elect to receive the 
death benefit or an allowance equal to the amount 
payable under Option 2 of the optional allowances 
under certain circumstances 
289 State Personnel and Pen- Sets out the manner in which unlimited adjustments 
sions §§ 29-4lO to 29-413 are computed and minimum benefits are awarded for 
the surviving spouse of a member of certain retire-
ment systems 
290 State Personnel and Pen- Sets out th~ manner in which five percent limited ad-
sions §§ 29-416 to 29-418 justments are computed for the surviving spouse of a 
member of certain retirement systems 
291 State Personnel and Pen- Sets out the manner in which combinations adjust-
sions §§ 29-421, 29-422 ments are determined for the surviving spouse of a 
member of certain retirement systems 
292 Tax General § 7-203(b) (2) Exempts "a spouse of the decedent ... a spouse of a 
child of the decedent or a spouse of a lineal descen-
dant of a child of the decedent" from the inheritance 
tax 
293 Tax General § 7- Exempts a spouse of a Holocaust victim from the in-
203(k) (2) (ii) heritance tax on "amounts received by a decedent as 
reparations or restitution for loss of liberty or damage 
to health." 
294 Tax General § 7-209 (c) (2) States that, "[w]hen property passes from a decedent 
to a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties and 
only 1 spouse is entitled to the [inheritance tax] ex-
emption," 50% of property is exempt from taxation 
and the remaining 50% is subject to the tax 
295 Tax General § 10-207(e- States that, the subtraction from the federal adjusted 
1) (2) gross income to determine Maryland adjusted gross 
income "includes a payment from a pension system to 
the surviving spouse ... of a law enforcement officer 
or fire fighter whose death arises out of or in the 
course of employment." 
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296 Tax General § 10- States that, the subtraction from the federal adjusted 
207(r) (2) gross income to determine Maryland adjusted gross 
income "includes the lesser of $1,200 or the modified 
Maryland adjusted gross income of the spouse with 
the lesser modified Maryland adjusted gross income" 
for a two-income married couple filing a joint tax re-
turn 
297 Tax General § 10- States that, the subtraction from the federal adjusted 
207(t)(2) (ii) gross income to determine Maryland adjusted gross 
income includes "amounts received by an individual 
as reparations or restitution for loss of liberty or dam-
age to health" because he or she is a spouse of a Hol-
ocaust victim 
298 Tax General § 10-209(b) States that, the subtraction from the federal adjusted 
gross income equal to the lesser of certain retirement 
benefits to determine Maryland adjusted gross income 
is allowed if a Maryland resident's spouse is totally dis-
abled 
299 Tax General § 1O-217(c) Sets out the amounts of the standard deduction to 
compute Maryland taxable income for an individual 
described as a surviving spouse and for spouses filing 
a joint return 
300 Tax General § 10-709(a), Allows an eligible low income taxpayer's spouse filing 
(b) a joint tax return to claim a credit against the state 
income tax for a taxable year 
301 Tax General § 1O-718(b) Allows an individual to "claim a credit against the 
State income tax in an amount equal to 100% of the 
eligible long-term care premiums paid by the individ-
ual during the taxable year for long-term care insur-
ance covering ... the individual's spouse." 
302 Tax General § 10-807 Requires that, "a husband and wife who file ajoint 
federal income tax return shall file a joint Maryland 
income tax return" except in certain circumstances 
303 Tax General § 10- Requires an indi~idual's surviving spouse to file their 
808(c) (2) decedent spouse's tax return if there is no personal 
represen tative 
304 Tax General § 13-905(b) Requires the Comptroller to pay a claim of refund to 
the estate of a decedent if the decedent's tax return 
was filed jointly by the surviving spouse and the per-
sonal representative 
305 Tax Property § 7-207(c) Exempts the dwelling house of a surviving spouse of a 
blind individual from property tax if the house had 
formerly been exempt 
306 Tax Property § 7-208(b), Exempts the dwelling house of a surviving spouse of a 
(c), (g), (h) disabled veteran from property tax given certain re-
quirements and authorizes refunds of property tax 
not exempted as well as interest for such tax assessed 
307 Tax Property §§ 8-226 to 8- Provides homeowners, including spouses and former 
228 spouses who have been permitted under a court or-
der or separation agreement to reside in a dwelling in 
which they have interest, with an application process 
to rezone real property as residential real property for 
property assessment purposes, with an exception stat-
ing that for spouses that transfer rezoned real proper-
ty, the property ceases to be rezoned 
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30S Tax Property § 9-101 (f) Allows an unmarried surviving spouse of a homeown-
er to claim a property tax credit for elderly or dis-
abled homeowners 
309 Tax Property § 9-104(h) Allows an unmarried surviving spouse of a homeown-
er to claim a property tax credit for eligible home-
owners 
310 Tax Property § 9-210(b) Allows "[tJhe Mayor and City Council of Baltimore 
City or the governing body of a county or municipal 
corporation" to grant a property tax credit "against 
the county or municipal corporation property tax im-
posed on a dwelling that is owned by a surviving 
spouse of a fallen law enforcement officer or rescue 
worker." 
311 Tax Property § 12- Exempts a spouse or former spouse from the recorda-
10S(c)(1), (d) tion tax if property subject to a mortgage or deed of 
trust, or an instrument of writing that transfers prop-
erty, is transferred to a spouse or former spouse 
312 Tax Property § 13- Exempts a spouse or former spouse from the transfer 
207(a)(2), (3) tax if property subject to a mortgage or deed of trust, 
or an instrument of writing that transfers property, is 
transferred to a spouse or former spouse 
313 Tax Property § 13-403 Exempts a spouse or former spouse from the county 
transfer tax if an instrument of writing that transfers 
property in accordance with a property settlement or 
divorce decree is transferred to a spouse or former 
spouse 
314 Transportation § 8-309(i) Establishing the right of a former owner, including a 
decedent's surviving spouse, to reacquire land to be 
conveyed by the Board of Public Works 
315 Transportation § 13-11S Requires a person whose name has changed by mar-
riage to both notify and apply for a corrected certifi-
cate of title for a vehicle at the Motor Vehicle Admin-
istration within 30 days of the change 
316 Transportation § 13-414(b) Requires a person "who has applied for or obtained 
the registration of a vehicle" and whose name has 
changed by marriage to notify the Motor Vehicle Ad-
ministration within 30 days and "apply for a corrected 
registration certificate." 
317 Transportation 13-503.1 Allows a married couple to execute certain kinds of 
transfers of vehicle registration plates and enable the 
transferee to continue using the transferred plates 
31S Transportation § 13-619 Allows a surviving spouse of a member of an eligible 
organization to apply for a special registration num-
ber 
319 Transportation § 13- Exempts a vehicle from the excise tax on the transfer 
S10(c)(1)(i), (5) of the vehicle and subsequent issuance of a certificate 
of title to a spouse, or a former spouse as a result of 
divorce or separation 
320 Transportation § 13- Exempts a vehicle from registration fees if the vehicle 
903(a)(9) is "owned and personally used by an individual who is 
at least 65 years old and is the surviving spouse of a 
deceased disabled veteran." 
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321 Transportation § 16-116(b) Requires a person who has applied for or obtained a 
driver's license and whose name has changed by mar-
riage to notify the Motor Vehicle Administration with-
in 30 days in writing 
322 Transportation § 23- Exempts a spouse from providing the inspection cer-
106(a) (2) (i) tificate when transferring a used automobile to anoth-
er spouse 
323 Article 2B § 8-217(a)(l) Making it unlawful in Prince George's County for any 
person under the age of 18 years, between 10:00 p.m. 
and 6:00 a.m., to be on the premises of the holder of 
any Class B or Class D alcohol license, unless the per-
son is in the immediate company of a designated per-
son, including his or her spouse 
324 Article 2B § 9-212(c)(4) In Garrett County, a surviving spouse that holds a de-
ceased licensee's alcohol license is exempt from any 
issuing fees on the license 
325 Article 2B § 10-506(b) Provides that, "[u]pon the death of any married [al-
cohol] licensee, ... a new license shall be issued to 
the surviving spouse," who may also be eligible for a 
renewal license 
326 Article 2B § 11-502(h) In Anne Arundel County, no person under the age of 
18 is allowed on the premises of any bowling alley 
with a Class B or Class D alcohol license between 2:00 
a.m. and 6:00 a.m., unless the person is accompanied 
by a designated individual, including his or her 
spouse 
327 Article 25 § 3(g-l) Various pension plans for Charles County employees, 
contain disability provisions and death benefits for 
spouses and/or minor children 
328 Article 25 § 3 (pp) (1 )-(2) If the Board of Commissioners of Calvert County es-
tablishes a pension plan for the Calvert County Sher-
itrs Department, the plan shall include death benefits 
for spouses and children 
329 Article 25 § 51(j)(3) States that, in Garrett County, "[t]he deputy treasurer 
may not be related to the County Treasurer by blood 
or marriage." 
330 Article 28 § 2-115(a)(l) No commissioner on the Maryland-National Capital 
Park and Planning Commission may "knowingly par-
ticipate in a decision affecting the financial interest of 
a person related to the commissioner or the commis-
sioner's spouse." 
331 Article 28 § 5-105.1 Whenever the Maryland-National Capital Park and 
Planning Commission acquires real property that re-
sults in the displacement of a person from his place 
of business or farm, eligible persons are entitled to a 
payment equal to the average annual net earnings, 
"includ[ ] ling] any compensation paid by the busi-
ness or farm operation to the owner, [or] his spouse," 
of the business or farm operation displaced 
332 Article 41 § 6-7A- Under the Community Attendant Services and Sup-
03(e)(2)(ii)(4) ports Program, of the Department of Human Re-
sources, the consumer's spouse is "barred from receiv-
ing medical assistance payments for providing ser-
vices." 
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333 Article 668 § 5.03(d) (2) Refers to Real Property Code § 14-121's provision re-
garding access to a burial site and the granting of an 
easement to an individual who is related to the in-
terred by blood or marriage 
334 Article 708 § 1 (c) Defining "congregate housing services" as "services 
provided in an apartment building that promote inde-
pendent living and include congregate meals, house-
keeping, and personal services for ... an individual 
at least 62 years old who has temporary or periodic 
difficulty with one or more essential activities of daily 
living," and the spouse of a person previously de-
scribed who is at least 55 years old and who has diffi-
culty with life activities as well 
335 Article 708 § 26 For the purposes of the Senior Citizens Activities Cen-
ters Capital Improvement Grants Program, projects 
that receive grants shall be for "elderly citizens," de-
fined as "a person 60 years old or older or a spouse 
of a person 60 years old or older." 
336 Article 838 § 2-611 (i) The Maryland Home Financing Program permits the 
" [t]ransfer of the mortgaged property or an interest 
therein without monetary consideration to a spouse, 
child, or other immediate family member, or in con-
nection with the death of a borrower, a divorce de-
cree, or a legal separation agreement." 
337 Article 88A § 77 On the death of any recipient of public assistance, 
the amount of assistance paid "shall be allowed as a 
claim against the estate ... [but] no such claim shall 
be enforced against any real estate ... while it is oc-
cupied by the recipient's surviving spouse or depen-
dents." 
338 Article 88A § 85(b) Under the Department of Human Resources, Com-
munity Home Care Services, "elderly persons" is de-
fined as those of at least 65 years of age, and their 
spouses regardless of their age 
339 Article 96 1/2 § 48 Special credit and merits may be extended to the 
spouses of veterans for the purposes of appointment 
to positions in municipal or county government made 
by merit based system 
